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Abstract
This research sought to assesss the safeguards protecting scientific objectivity in New
Zealand deep-water fisheries science decision-making fora. Managing depleted, slow-
growing and poorly-understood stocks demands particularly accurate, objective scien-
tific information. New Zealand’s Ministry of Fisheries undertakes deep-water fisheries
management in an information-poor, high-stakes context. This context means neither
of the two strictly separate policy and scientific advice processes is able, in isolation,
to provide advice confidently. Preliminary investigations suggested that to enable the
Ministry to meet the ongoing need for management of deep-water fishing, science fora
are effectively taking on a quasi-policy role.
This research investigated whether deep-water fisheries science processes have suf-
ficient safeguards to protect the objectivity of scientific decision-making in this diffi-
cult climate, thereby ensuring maximum accuracy in their advice. Twenty-two per-
sonal interviews were conducted with key informants, and analysed using grounded
theory. Themes thus revealed were analysed in light of concepts from economics,
philosophy of science and institutional analysis literature. Research suggested that the
scientific process is ill-suited for handling non-scientific judgements, and the spread of
non-scientific considerations into scientific fora is risking the objectivity of scientific
analysis which is critical for fisheries management. Imbalanced stakeholder repre-
sentation in scientific fora further imperils objectivity in these fora, with potentially
significant implications for sustainable fisheries management.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context of the research
While New Zealand’s seas are relatively unproductive in world terms, its Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) is large and hosts a great variety of biota,1 with unknown
species continuing to be discovered.2 The fishing industry earns New Zealand around
$1.35 billion annually in export revenues.3 Both fisheries and marine environments
provide considerable benefit to New Zealanders, but are conditionally renewable re-
sources. Good management is the difference between the benefits from marine re-
sources continuing to flow indefinitely, or being reduced or even temporarily or per-
manently cut off — with potentially enormous losses for New Zealanders. The gov-
ernment’s Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) is responsible for managing all fishing within
New Zealand’s EEZ and extended Continental Shelf (and by New Zealand-flagged
vessels outside it), as well as fishing’s effects on the marine environment. The Min-
istry’s empowering statute is the 1996 Fisheries Act (the Act), of which the purpose is
“sustainable utilisation” of fisheries resources.
QMS: main tool The Quota Management System (QMS) is the principal tool by
which the Ministry manages the nation’s fisheries, supplemented by regulations to
control environmental externalities. The QMS works by allocating property rights
(tradeable access and withdrawal rights) to species. Total allowable catches (TACs)
identify the fishable component of target stocks based on assessments of their maxi-
mum sustainable yield (MSY) subject to risk constraints.
1Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2007)
2Ministry of Fisheries (2007g)
3Ministry of Fisheries (2007f)
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Information needs The QMS relies on a steady supply of high-quality marine re-
search to link its property right structure (quotas and access rights) to the animals in
the sea via permissible levels of harvest and associated impacts. TACs are reviewed
annually, and set based on two sets of information: scientific advice on the biological
and ecological status of stocks and their “fishability”, and policy advice on the “hu-
man” implications of different levels of fishing. A comparable process produces the
less numerous limits on bycatch. Without this information, allowable catches, fishers’
quotas and the limits on externalities such as bycatch are arbitrary numbers that could
be above or below a safe level of fishing. This would mean either under-utilisation or
over-exploitation of valuable renewable resources. New Zealand fisheries management
is therefore very information-hungry.
Providing the information: two streams Scientific advice is generated each year
through a cyclical process. MFish scientists, in consultation with fisheries stakehold-
ers, form recommendations for what fisheries research the Ministry should purchase
that year. MFish scientists use the “best available” scientific information (pursuant to
the Act’s section 10) to assess the status of target and bycatch stocks and the impacts
of fishing activity, also in consultation with representatives of the main fisheries stake-
holders. Policy advice, meanwhile, is generated through a linked but separate process,
also including consultation rounds, which ascertains the social, economic and cultural
effects of various catch-setting options. Based on these two sets of advice, the Fish-
eries Minister makes fisheries management decisions. The great majority of these are
setting catch and bycatch limits.
The processes and people generating the two sets of advice are quite separate
within the Ministry of Fisheries. The decision-making mandate of the annual sci-
entific fora is strictly scientific and technological, limited to considering and advising
the Minister on the ecological and biological implications of fisheries management
decisions. Advice on the allocative and distributive effects of fisheries management
decisions — the social, cultural and economic implications — is the domain of policy-
makers. These are much more subjective phenomena, varying according to people’s
perceptions and world-views. They are also assessed qualitatively rather than quantita-
tively (with the exception of financial returns to the fishing industry). In this thesis the
terms “science” and “scientific” will be used to denote the natural sciences, the fields
in which the Ministry of Fisheries’ scientific fora operate. “Non-scientific” research
or information will mean social science-based information that may be delivered by
expert research but is not from the “hard” or “natural sciences”. “Scientific fora” is
therefore an umbrella term for FAWG, RPG and RCC meetings
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1.2 Critical role of clean science
Accurate scientific information on stocks is what connects the QMS and catch limits
to the real animals in the sea, and is critical for New Zealand’s fisheries to be prop-
erly managed. The idea of science as value-neutral investigation that is society’s only
reliable route to the “truth” has been significantly eroded in the past three decades. It
is now acknowledged in many quarters that it is neither possible nor necessarily desir-
able that scientists hermetically seal off their work from their values4 (see Conceptual
Framework). However this thesis’ position is that the biota that fishers pursue are
fundamentally objective phenomena, existing independently of our awareness or com-
prehension of them. Fish and other marine biota have certain biological and ecolog-
ical characteristics that determine the nature of their existence regardless of humans’
awareness and understanding of them. However our knowledge informs our actions in
exploiting these resources, via fisheries management mechanisms. Scientists’ role is
to provide society with a picture of marine resources that is as accurate as possible, as
closely representing the objective “truth” as possible — in other words, with minimal
influence from subjective considerations.
“Fisheries” in this thesis will refer to fish stocks and the ecosystems in which they
exist. “Fisheries research” and “deep-water research” therefore means research into
fish and other living marine resources, and does not include research into non-living
marine resources.
1.2.1 Science for fisheries management
Fisheries are socio-ecological phenomena, and New Zealand’s fisheries management
system, like every other, must simultaneously tackle the issues around both the hu-
man and the non-human components. It is difficult for scientific decision-making to
operate in this context without being affected by non-scientific, subjective influences.
Management decisions for deep-water fisheries, where scientific uncertainty5 is very
high, yet fished-down stocks and slow-growing target and non-target species demand
especially precise management, exhibit “wicked problem” characteristics. They fall
into a zone between policy and science where neither process can provide useful in-
formation independently, and the boundary between scientific and policy considera-
tions becomes indistinct. Because annual catch limits must be set, decisions must be
4Popper (1959); Polanyi (1958); Kuhn (1970); Feyerabend (1975)
5Wynne (1992) distinguishes uncertainty (knowing a system’s parameters but not the quantitative
importance of its components), risk (knowing a system’s parameters and being able to quantitatively as-
sess probabilities), indeterminacy (a relativist concept of knowledge highlighting the subjectivity of hu-
man understanding of phenomena) and and ignorance (essentially not knowing what we do not know)—
Wynne (1992). “Uncertainty” will be used as an umbrella term encompassing all these types, for they are
all frequent features of deep-water fisheries management.
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made. In deep-water fisheries, a number of factors have meant that the scientific arm
of the fisheries management process has picked up much of the burden of substantive
decision-making.
These are not ideal conditions for regularised, robust scientific decision-making,
but this alone does not undermine confidence in the process. However the composi-
tion of the science fora is additional dimension to New Zealand deep-water scientific
decision-making. MFish’s stakeholder consultation practices have been extended to
the scientific process via “approved parties” (under section 12 of the Act). The sci-
entific and technical function of these meeting rounds means specialist expert repre-
sentation is needed to participate properly in debates. The cost of engaging expert
representation means that the two stakeholders with the clearest interest in the results
of deep-water research, environmental groups and fishing industry groups, are very
unequally represented.
Without the highly specialised expertise that would permit examination of the
scientific decisions themselves, a lay observer such as a taxpayer must look to the
decision-making processes and structures for assurance that science is fulfilling its
role and providing accurate — i.e. objective — information on what is happening in
the seas. That quasi-policy decisions are being made in science-only fora exhibiting
sharp disparities in representation suggests that the objectivity and therefore quality of
scientific decision-making in those fora may be compromised.
Research question This thesis therefore seeks to investigate the following question:
Are there sufficient checks and balances in deep-water scientific fora such that one
can be satisfied that the most accurate and objective picture of the resource is produced
from a given amount of research spending?
Methodological issue The thesis was originally intended to provide an assessment
of objectivity in research fora from an external vantage point, making only supple-
mentary use of the personal views of individuals who participate therein. However an
absence of records of the rationales for decisions to make a first-hand assessment of
these questions (see Methodology section) meant that personal interviews became the
central data source. Individuals closely involved in deep-water fisheries research were
interviewed to gain insight into what goes on in the yearly scientific fora.
Process for examining research questions The unique elements of the New Zealand
context were identified, and are found in Chapter Three. An Intellectual Framework
was developed to identify the literary and theoretical context for the research, presented
in Chapter Four. The main themes are:
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• the ”science-related” constraints to which scientists in deep- water fisheries re-
search fora are subject — both those imposed by the scientific community and
by their own drivers. These include:
– the importance of objectivity and disinterestedness, and how to react to
challenges to these
– how to deal with uncertainty
– the scientific tradition’s notions of the truth and the role of the scientific
community
• the non-scientific pressures to which these scientists are subject, generated both
by the institutions in which they work and by their own personal drivers
• notions of the greater good
• ideas about the role of the private and public sectors
• views of ideal distributions of natural resources, and
• views of the role of science and policy.
Personal interviews lasting around one hour were conducted with key individuals
in the Ministry’s deep-water scientific decision-making processes, and with key people
involved in deep-water fisheries and their management. Interview material was anal-
ysed using grounded theory techniques, observing the emergence of themes around:
• the political, economic, social and cultural context of fisheries science
• notions of appropriate and inappropriate subject-matter for scientific fora to con-
sider
• the roles of government and other parties in fisheries science
• perceived drivers of scientific meeting participants’ behaviour
• the effects that legal and policy frameworks and science funding structures have
on the provision and handling of science.
Revealed themes were then analysed using the concepts in the Intellectual Frame-
work, to give insight into the safeguards operating in deep-water fisheries research
fora to ensure objectivity of scientific analysis. These results are presented in Chapter
Five. Chapter Six is the Discussion, where the results are examined in light of the
Conceptual Framework
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1.3 Contribution of this research
The issue of non-scientific influences in scientific and technical fisheries decision-
making has so far not been examined in New Zealand. New Zealand fisheries science
has had some general attention in academic literature since the bureaucratic reforms
of the late 1980s and mid-1990s. 6 Interpretive social-constructivist approaches using
grounded theory, similar to that employed in this thesis, have been applied in some
fisheries contexts overseas,7 but have not been applied to New Zealand.
6Starr et al. (1998); West et al. (1999); McClurg (2000); Harte (2001); McKoy (2006)
7Jentoft (1999); Weeks and Packard (1997)
Chapter 2
Methodology
2.1 Aim and Objectives
2.1.1 Aim of the study
This thesis examines theMinistry of Fisheries’ scientific fora, which provide biological
and ecological information on New Zealand’s deep-water fish and marine resources. It
seeks to ascertain whether there are sufficient safeguards operating in these scientific
and technical fora to protect the objectivity of their decision-making. This will assist
understanding of how New Zealand’s fisheries management processes are dealing with
highly uncertain decision-making situations, where the boundaries between scientific
and policy processes are indistinct.
2.1.2 Research question and objectives
This thesis approaches its aim via the following question and objectives:
Are there sufficient safeguards operating in deep-water scientific fora that
without understanding the particulars of fisheries science, one can be con-
fident that the scientific process is producing the most accurate and objec-
tive possible picture of New Zealand’s deep-water biota?
Objective 1: Construct a conceptual framework from literature on the forces and phe-
nomena involved in gathering and using scientific and non-scientific informa-
tion for natural resource management. This will provide an impression of the
different forces operating in the deep-water scientific fora which will inform the
gathering and analysis of primary data.
Objective 2: Gather information on the forces and decision-making processes in New
Zealand deep-water fisheries science fora.
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Objective 3: Analyse this data using grounded theory processes, and analyse the re-
sulting hypotheses using the conceptual framework. This will place these propo-
sitions in the context of what is known about decision-making in similar circum-
stances, and suggest their implications for the objectivity and accuracy of the
scientific information being produced.
Objective 4: Make an assessment of how likely it is that normal decision-making pro-
cesses in deep-water scientific fora are ensuring the most objective, accurate
pictures of deep-water resources are being fed into the fisheries management
process. From this information, make recommendations for further research
and investigation.
2.2 Methodological Approach: General Strategy of Inquiry
2.2.1 Research paradigm
As a researcher, openness about one’s paradigm1 and the values one holds is essential.
“Reflexivity” is therefore employed, which recognises the impossibility of conduct-
ing value-free research, but attempts to ensure that values do not make untrammelled
incursions into the research process.2
There are two elements to the author’s research paradigm for investigating the han-
dling of science in New Zealand’s deep-water fisheries management. It is based on a
belief in the objectivity of the natural world, whose phenomena exist independently
of human regard, but takes a social constructivist perspective to the human or social
world. It draws on Kiser and Ostrom’s (1982) “rational institutionalism”model.3 Here,
individuals’ perceptions of the world and their behaviour in interacting with it are de-
termined by a combination of internally-generated motivations, including economic
rationalism, and externally-generated world-views, guides and rules instilled by the
institutions in which they live. “Institutions” in this formulation denotes “the con-
ventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of a society”.4 This includes families,
schools and other educational institutions, places of employment, social and cultural
groups, and nation states. For this analysis the main institutional drivers of behaviour
are governments, the scientific community, environmental non-government organisa-
tions (ENGOs), and companies. Their influences are most likely to be identifiable
in analysing information about what takes place in fisheries research fora. Individ-
ual interviewees’ opinions and actions in fisheries science fora are therefore presumed
1The ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological assumptions one has about the
world Bailey (2007, page 60).
2Bryman (2001, page 23)
3Kiser and Ostrom (1982)
4Vatn (2005, page 60)
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to be products of a complex and dynamic web of forces. An investigation of what
these forces are, and how they interact to drive individuals’ actions in fisheries science
fora, must therefore take an appropriate approach. The subjective and highly intercon-
nected nature of behavioural drivers prohibits a positivist or reductionist approach and
demands one that is holistic and contextual.
This difficulty in predicting what might inform someone’s views of a phenomenon
(such as an event or a piece of research) makes it essential that the researcher avoid
imposing ideas upon the data (part of reflexivity). An inductive approach within a
qualitative and descriptive research design is therefore the most appropriate. Due to
the limitations of this thesis’ scope, case study research design will be used, with inter-
views from key informants. While these methodological choices limit the replicability,
reliability and validity of the study, the insights gained from the flexibility and contex-
tual holism of inductive inquiry will have greater scope for applicability.5
2.2.2 Research design
Two major approaches to qualitative research are evident in the literature: analytic
induction6 and grounded theory.7 Analytic induction is unsuited to this thesis’ research
question, whereas grounded theory allows for ongoing revision of categorisations and
theories.8 This makes it particularly suitable for studying a dynamic field such as
fisheries management. Theory produced by a grounded theory study can be presented
in different ways.9 In this thesis it will be used to paint a picture of the interplay
between scientific and other forces in fisheries science fora, and ascertain the degree
to which the objectivity of meetings’ decision-making appears to be protected.
Data sources and implications for research design
The original research question was to assess the objectivity of research-purchasing
decisions, based primarily on records of the Ministry of Fisheries’ deep-water and
aquatic environment research planning meetings. Objectivity would be assessed by
comparing research projects’ eventual fate with whether participants in research plan-
ning processes supported or opposed them. These data would be “triangulated”10 by
comparison with personal interview data from a few key stakeholders to strengthen re-
sulting conclusions. However the Ministry’s Chief Scientist, Dr Pamela Mace, advised
5Malinowski (1922)
6The researcher collects data until no cases that are inconsistent with his or her hypothesis are found
and a general explanation of the phenomenon is thereby established Bryan (1984).
7Glaser and Strauss (1967)
8Charmaz (2000)
9Cresswell (2007)
10Denzin (1978); Hill (1984)
10 CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY
me that it is impossible to ascertain why any research project was approved, adjusted
or rejected without attending the meeting in question. This is because record-keeping
is somewhat sporadic; with the exception of any personal notes taken by participants,
records of research planning group (RPG) meetings are exclusively verbal. Where of-
ficial records exist for research coordinating committee (RCC) meetings, they are not
sufficiently detailed to provide the desired information (Mace pers. comm. 2.10.2006).
Tantalisingly, in some years (such as in 2004-05 and 2006-07), the information sought
has been recorded and made public, but this has been done too infrequently to provide
a usable sample.
Public record-keeping has implications for open government, public participation
and democracy, as reflected in the existence of the Official Information Act (1982),11
and is therefore an important part of public management. However record-keeping
takes resources away fromMinistries’ core business, so the ratio by which effort should
be allocated to record-keeping and to the core business of government is an ongoing
issue.12
This lack of documentation of the reasons for research planning decisions neces-
sitated that the research shift to assessing the scientific process as a whole via key
participants’ individual testimonies. More interviews were then arranged, a qualitative
research design was constructed, and the reduction in the robustness of the thesis’ con-
clusions was acknowledged. However the focus on procedural robustness as a proxy
for the quality (objectivity and therefore accuracy) of scientific outputs remained, as
this is one of the few ways a layperson can assess the scientific processes.
2.3 Research Processes
2.3.1 Objective 1: Literature review / conceptual framework
The New Zealand Context section provides the real-world context for interpretation of
the data. It gives a brief history of New Zealand fisheries management, with a focus
on recent events in the deep-water fisheries and aquatic environment areas, and out-
lines the main elements now involved in managing New Zealand’s marine resources.
Material for this section came principally from books and academic articles, and some
information came from research participants during interviews.
11Shaw and Eichbaum (2005)
12Pollitt (2000)
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2.3.2 Objective 2: Primary data collection
Method and participant selection
In-depth personal interviews were chosen over other data-gathering methods such as
questionnaires and surveys in order to gain a socialised perspective of the subject.13
The semi-structured interview style was chosen to allow participants to cover topics
that they felt were relevant and thereby ensure that data collection was not unduly
constrained by the researcher’s own ignorance of the area — the “observer as partici-
pant”.14 The aim was to restrain, to a moderate level, researcher “participantness” —
where the researcher acts or has the effect of acting as a participant and affects the
outcome of the research.15
The “key informant” purposive approach was taken to selecting interviewees,16 as
an individual’s “key” status in their field also usually means they have a broad, deep
knowledge of the area.17 Initially participants were chosen by identifying the major
stakeholder groups,18 noting who key figures were from relevant organisations’ staff
lists, and observing the occurrence of names in submissions and conference papers.
The major stakeholder groups for deep-water fisheries management are: the Ministry
of Fisheries (in its role as representing the interests of the people of New Zealand), the
fishing industry (comprising a range of stakeholders from quota owners through skip-
pers to political representatives), environmental NGOs, science providers, and Maori.
The absence of recreational and Maori customary fishing in deep water, and the fact
that these groups are rarely if ever represented in deep-water research fora renders
the “action arena”19 narrower than for shared fisheries, and therefore these groups
were not pursued. Inside these major groups, several sub-groups needed to be repre-
sented in the participant sample: present and past Ministry of Fisheries science policy
staff (to ensure good coverage of the relevant period), skippers, managers and politi-
cal representatives from the fishing industry, and both NIWA and competitor science
providers. The small number of environmental representatives who regularly attend
research meetings, and the paucity of science providers who contest for Ministry and
industry deep-water research contracts, both constrained the depth of participant se-
lection.
Once identified, potential participants were then approached by phone (if in or near
Wellington) or by email (if overseas), and informal discussions of fisheries manage-
13Marshall and Rossman (2006, page 133)
14Gold (1969)
15Patton (2002)
16Patton (2002)
17Davidson and Tolich (2001, page 123)
18Grimble (1998)
19Ostrom et al. (1994)
12 CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY
ment often ensued as people suggested areas the study could focus on. From then a
“snowballing” approach was used, as during initial informal discussions and later in-
terviews, participants often also recommended other individuals whom I subsequently
contacted. Of the 24 people approached, one person refused outright to be interviewed,
and two others had to withdraw due to personal and family problems.
Interviewing
Primary supervisor Cath Wallace stipulated that in order to ensure would-be intervie-
wees felt secure participating in the research, despite her activity as a lobbyist for the
environmental movement, provision be made to protect interview material. This was
endorsed by the University’s Human Ethics Committee, and entailed the maintenance
of “Chinese walls” and other provisions (described briefly below) to ensure that no in-
formation that was not authorised to go in the thesis’ final copy was communicated to
Ms Wallace (see Participant Information sheet in Appendix C). Secondary supervisor
Richard Willis took on the role of supervising sensitive material.
Performed between August 2006 and August 2007, the semi-structured interviews
lasted around one hour and took place in person, by telephone or via Skype. One
interview was via email. Participants could choose how anonymously their material
would be cited, and could opt to receive a summary of the findings prior to publication.
About half the sample took this opportunity. There were many tantalising comments
made in informal conversations associated with this study, including in preliminary
discussions to interviews, but if official interview questions could not draw these out
“on the record”, they could not be used.
Interviews were discursive in form, with questions drawn from a series of potential
question schedules. These covered the themes of interest to the research and were sent
to each interviewee in advance (see Appendix C). Questions’ wording was regularly
modified to improve clarity and suit each participant’s area of expertise. Interviews
would begin with Human Ethics approval formalities, and move to an open question
that encouraged participants to range over the subject, followed by more directed,
probing questions as recommended by Flick.20 Clarifying and follow-up questions
were both essential and regularly used, in order (respectively) to minimise the need for
ex-post-facto interpretation and to ensure interviewees addressed the research focus
areas.
Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed, and both transcriptions and record-
ings were analysed. While these processes were time-consuming and expensive and
recording undoubtedly had an effect on participants’ responses,21 it was important
20Flick (2002)
21Dunn (2005)
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to appreciate inflexions and tones (such as sarcasm) in responses and to ensure loss
of context was minimised.22 The disadvantages of cassette recordings were revealed
when two tapes became stretched and damaged. Following this a digital recorder was
procured for the remaining interviews.
2.3.3 Objective 3: Analysis of data
In accordance with grounded theory, responses were coded at increasing levels of anal-
ysis.23
Open coding
Initial (“open”) coding was according to the basic subject-matter of the response (which
did not always match the question asked, though such non-answers can themselves be
data24). The following are some examples of codes:
• Section 10 / precautionary principle — effect, definitions
• Management for all New Zealanders — (including non-extractive uses)
• Advocacy in science — appropriate and inappropriate matters
• Cost recovery — perverse incentive?
• Commercial science — trustworthiness?
• Macro-scale direction for New Zealand fisheries
• Role of a government scientist
There were 25 different open codes in total, which were numbered for quick ref-
erence. Adhesive flags with corresponding numbers were stuck to the pertinent sec-
tions of interview transcripts in order to facilitate recourse to the raw data (required
by grounded theory’s iterative process). Memos were taken from the outset, as recom-
mended by Backman and Kynga¨s (1999).
Axial coding
Secondary (“focussed” or “axial”) coding examined the issues participants considered
relevant to the question (which revealed what causal connections and relationships they
22Opie (2001)
23Coffey and Atkinson (1996)
24Dunn (2005, page 94)
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perceived in the issues in question), and the language participants used (which indi-
cated their opinions about these things). For example, part of a participant’s response
may be initially coded with “Commercial science — trustworthiness?”, and might
focus on the importance of scientifically-designed, independent research (which is ex-
pensive). It would also contain the comment “I hate to say it but a big stumbling block
is industry people trying to do cheap and nasty surveys to save money”. Therefore this
data would receive axial codes identifying independent research, its costliness, and the
cost-consciousness of industry, and a memo identifying the participant’s reluctance
to express the statement and the relative strength of the “cheap and nasty” idiom to
describe industry research.
Tertiary coding and theory development
Tertiary coding sought underlying themes and mental models as signalled by the rhetoric
and metaphors participants used. Theory was being developed by this stage (though it
was constantly evolving as its relationship with codes and the raw data revealed differ-
ent themes and trends). This dynamism and iterative process are part of the essence of
grounded theory.25
Tertiary codes came from the language that participants used, which indicates un-
derlying assumptions about the subject26 (though tailoring to the researcher’s presence
is an inevitable phenomenon27). For example, participants’ use of “we” and “they” in-
dicates a sense of inclusion in or standing outside certain groups, while a participant’s
use of the language of efficiency (productivity, maximising value, waste) suggests a
different view of marine resources from someone who employs the language of assets
(guardian, trusteeship, legacy). Memos were used to chart the development of these
emerging elements, and to identify relationships and causal links between both differ-
ent participants’ (and groups of participants’) perceptions, and between the data and
the academic literature in the conceptual framework section.
The conceptual framework was used to place some context around and help de-
scribe the observed views, perceptions and relationships. Policy and institutional anal-
ysis literature28 helped by providing some axial codes which eventually formed the
structure of the Discussion.
25Corbin and Strauss (1990)
26Silber (1995)
27Fineman and Opie (1987)
28Young et al. (1996); Yandle (2001)
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2.4 Limitations
2.4.1 Limitations of the research approach
It is extremely difficult to achieve and maintain the “clean slate” mental state, free from
preconceived notions of what might emerge from your data, that grounded theory ad-
vocates.29 The requirements to present a reasonably well-formulated research question
for a thesis proposal force a certain amount of preconception upon the researcher. In-
deed, some authors argue that the passiveness of the researcher is over-emphasised in
grounded theory; themes do not “emerge like daffodils from the data”, but are drawn
out by the researcher.30 Funder (2005) argues that researchers’ institutional experi-
ence and context (with institution in its broad sense) play an enormous role in how
investigated phenomena are structured and labelled.31 He cites Fetterman’s (1998)
statement that researchers should ideally enter the field “with an open mind, not an
empty head”.32
A particular pitfall of grounded theory is risk of losing the context of respondents’
comments (and misinterpreting them) as coding or categorisation proceeds.33 Some
participants requested to “vet” any instances where their material would be used, which
allowed correct context to be ensured.34 However this was time-consuming and rel-
atively onerous given ongoing changes to the writing by the researcher, as well as
changes requested by participants, so unless a participant requested “vetting”, recourse
was made to the raw data rather than the interviewee.
2.4.2 Limitations of this study
The small interviewee sample added to the high level of subjectivity inherent in both
the data’s form and in its interpretation. In particular, the attenuated sample of en-
vironmental non-government organisation (ENGO) respondents mean that this group
was under-represented. The highly qualitative and subjective approach means that the
researcher’s subjective judgements are inevitably interwoven from the outset. How-
ever, the data collected and approach taken provide a more holistic view of the subject
than an empirical approach, and the more contextualised nature of such a methodology
makes it better suited to informing practical application.
The conclusions of this study will highlight an area of New Zealand fisheries man-
agement that has not yet benefited from having the spotlight of academic and policy
29Backman and Kynga¨s (1999)
30Bailey (2007, page 127)
31Funder (2005)
32Fetterman (1998)
33Jacobs (1970, viii)
34Questioning the authenticity of a participants’ ex post facto retraction of comments cannot be enter-
tained, as a participant’s word is final.
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examination trained upon it. While the spotlight approached recently with the Fish-
eries Amendment Bill 2007’s proposal to amend section 10, research purchasing was
not directly in its focus. This thesis’ conclusions will fall into a largely unstudied area.
Even if the recommendations are ignored, the issue of how institutional structure and
processes can distort how values and science are used in fisheries decision-making will
hopefully be examined by the academic and policy community.
Chapter 3
New Zealand Context
3.1 The Status Quo
New Zealand exercises sovereign rights of management under the 1982 United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) over an Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ)1 of approximately 4.2 million square kilometres which descends to depths of
10,000 metres.2 The MFish is the principal government department mandated to gov-
ern New Zealand’s seas, managing fisheries and most of the marine environment under
the Fisheries Act 1996 (the Act). The Act’s purpose is to provide for the utilisation
of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability (section 8). Several other agencies
manage different aspects of the seas under a variety of Acts,3 but in terms of area the
MFish has by far the greatest responsibility. (For discussions of jurisdictional issues
in New Zealand seas, see Weeber (1998) and Peart (2005).)
3.1.1 The Ministry’s role and responsibilities
Like all Ministries, MFish receives tax funding to conduct its activities, and is obliged
to follow traditional processes for budgeting. It requests its yearly funding from Par-
liament in a process timetabled around the financial year (rather than the October-to-
October fishing year). The Primary Production Select Committee reports to Parliament
recommending the Ministry’s budget and also financially reviews the Ministry every
year. The Office of the Controller and Auditor-General can conduct financial and per-
1See Glossary of Abbreviations for explanations of acronyms in this text.
2Fisheries (2005)
3These include the Department of Conservation (which administers marine reserves, marine mammals
and threatened species under the Conservation Act 1987, Marine Reserves Act 1971, the Wildlife Act
1953 and the Marine Mammals Protection Act 1978), territorial authorities (which manage coast and
inshore waters out to 12 nautical miles (nm) under the Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991, and
Maritime New Zealand (Ministry of Transport) which administers nautical travel under the Maritime
Transport Act 1994.
17
18 CHAPTER 3. NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT
formance audits of MFish under the under the Public Finance Act (1989), checking
for adherence to its projected output classes. As part of the public service, whose po-
litical independence is an important if somewhat theoretical aspect of New Zealand’s
constitutional structures4), the MFish must also ensure that its policy is consistent with
over-arching government strategies. These are currently articulated in documents such
as the Growth and Innovation Framework, Environment 2010 and government policy
themes.5 Government departments’ policy is coordinated by the Treasury, the State
Services Commission and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.6 The inde-
pendence of the public service as advisors to Ministers is an important aspect of New
Zealand’s constitutional structure; its loyalties must be to the government of the day
rather than a political party.7
MFish sees its purpose as ensuring that fisheries are sustainably used within a
healthy aquatic ecosystem.8 This entails advising the government on the policy and
legal frameworks for the efficient and sustainable use of fisheries, delivering services
that support their effective operation, protecting the aquatic environment, managing
marine biosecurity risks, maintaining relationships with tangata whenua and support-
ing the Crown’s obligations to Maori for fisheries.9 130 species are commercially
fished in New Zealand, of which 97 species and species complexes are in the Quota
Management System (QMS), the Ministry’s principal tool for managing fisheries.10
Of these, 55% are known to be at or near target levels (72 of 130 stocks). 85 stocks
have sufficient information to ascertain stock levels. Quota holdings are worth approx-
imately $3.8 billion, and the Ministry’s budget for 2007/08 is $93.7 million excluding
GST.11 Research budgets average around $25 million annually. Around 33% of the
Ministry’s costs are recovered from the industry.
ITQs, ACEs, TACs and TACCs MFish manages fisheries principally by setting To-
tal Allowable Catches (TACs) under section 13 of the Act for target stocks. TACs are
for all fishing on fish stocks12 which include allocations for recreational, Maori cus-
tomary and commercial extraction (the latter is the Total Allowable Commercial Catch
or TACC), including consideration for any illegal fishing. MFish also sets “sustainabil-
ity measures” to ensure that marine resources are distributed properly over time (sec-
4Mulgan (2004)
5Families: Young and Old, Economic Transformation, and Strengthening National Identity, to which
“sustainability is central” Clark (2007, page 6).
6Shaw and Eichbaum (2005)
7Martin (2003)
8Ministry of Fisheries (2007d)
9Ministry of Fisheries (2007d)
10Ministry of Fisheries (2007a)
11Ministry of Fisheries (2007f)
12Ministry of Fisheries (2007h)
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tion 11). Fishers can hold one or both of a withdrawal right (Annual Catch Entitlement
or ACE) and an access right (Individual Transferable Quota or ITQ), which Kerr et al
(2003) describe as a right to a perpetual stream of ACEs. These are tradeable rights
to a percentage of the TAC for the pertinent stock, with decentralised trading occur-
ring relatively freely in multiple markets13. Catches must be matched with quota, and
landed fish are tracked through comprehensive reporting requirements (administered
since 2001 by an industry-run company, FishServe). The Ministry is responsible for
compliance and enforcement, done with a variety of measures ranging from licensed
fish receivers to at-sea surveillance by on-board observers and Air Force Orion air-
craft. Criminal penalties apply to such behaviour as falsifying records, over-catching
and dumping fish. In the QMS’ early days research showed signs of improving fisher
satisfaction with enforcement,14 but enforcement capacity is an ongoing problem.15
BMSY and other obligations Section 13 obliges the Minister to manage fish stocks
at or above the biomass that will support the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY).
While BMSY is calculated using fisheries science, the choice of harvest strategy also
influences the biomass level to which the stock is managed. MFish describes s13 as
prescribing a ’threshold’ for ensuring sustainability, with limited scope for manage-
ment above and below BMSY in accordance with the Act’s Purpose. This interprets
BMSY as a target reference point rather than a limit .16
Section 5 stipulates that decisions made under the Act must be consistent with
New Zealand’s international legal obligations for fisheries, and with the provisions of
the Treaty ofWaitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act (1992). The Act’s s12 and the
Ministry’s commitment to “open government” in “Towards Fisheries 2010” oblige the
Minister, when setting TACs and sustainability measures, to consult with the classes
of persons nationally representative of those having an interest in the stock or aquatic
environment affected by the fishing in question. This usually includes Maori, environ-
mental, commercial and recreational interests.17 The Minister has discretion to deter-
mine these classes,18 and once determined, the Ministry is only statutorily required to
“. . . consult with the person or organisation who is considered to be representative of
those classes of persons”.19 There is significant case-law on consultation, both gener-
13Kerr et al. (2003, page 124)
14Boyd and Dewees (1992)
15Ministry of Fisheries (2004)
16Ministry of Fisheries (2006a, 2007h)
17The Fisheries Act is relatively unusual in its absence of provision for wider public participation.
Other major environmental statutes make such provision, including the Hazardous Substances and New
Organisms Act (2003), the Conservation Act (1987) and the Resource Management Act (1991).
18Ministerial discretion is a major part of the Act. The highly operational level of research planning
and stock assessment decisions, however, means that it is extremely rare than the Minister would ever
decide to exercise discretion and depart from the Ministry’s recommendations on these matters.
19Ministry of Fisheries (2001b, page 4)
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ally and for fisheries.
3.1.2 Fisheries science processes
Topography of fisheries research procurement
Each year the Ministry’s Science Group runs three interlocking processes which pro-
vide the fisheries research that links the QMS to the animals in the sea. A diagram
of the science process is shown below (see 3.1). Contestability of government science
purchasing, instituted as part of the public sector reforms of the mid-1990s and de-
signed to maximise efficiency of supply,20 requires the Ministry to procure fisheries
research by competitive tender. For expensive projects, transparency requirements ne-
cessitate engaging external experts to assess tenders. While there is a healthy science
provider market in most fisheries, independent research capacity in the deep water is
chiefly limited to the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research, NIWA,
which wins the great majority (by value) of deep water contracts.21
These processes are broadly guided by the government’s priorities as indicated
by such documents as the Biodiversity Strategy, “Towards Fisheries 2010”, and the
Growth and Innovation Framework.22 The Science Group runs Fishery Assessment
Working groups (FAWGs) which produce scientific information on stocks’ status and
(via a separate but related process) the sustainability measures needed to maintain
stocks in accordance with the Act. Research Planning Groups (RPGs) assess species’
research needs, and manage the processes that send a recommendation to the Minister
to procure research that produces stock assessments, sustainability research and gen-
eral public good research. They undertake consultation on research procurement and
funding and the means by which it is paid for.
A major feature of the New Zealand fisheries science landscape is cost recovery
for fisheries management services. This is explained further below (see “Funding and
management reform”). In essence, the fishing industry must reimburse the govern-
ment for the costs of fisheries management from which it is the principal beneficiary
via the Fisheries Services Levy (to MFish) and the Conservation Services Levy (to the
Department of Conservation). The Ministry funds research which is deemed to be in
the wider public interest, and the industry is cost-recovered for research such as stock
assessments (which is of commercial benefit) and for part of the cost of research that
benefits both the industry and the public. The latter is calculated on the “attributable
costs principle” as laid out in “the Agreement” (the Fisheries Cost Recovery Rules
2001, statutory regulation 2001/299 under section 263 of the Act). The Agreement
20Cartner and Bollinger (1997)
21McKoy (2006)
22Ministry of Fisheries (2006d)
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Figure 3.1: A simplified version of the Ministry of Fisheries’ decision-making pro-
cesses.
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dictates inter alia the proportions of costs of fisheries management and conservation
services to be borne by the fishing industry, either as a specific percentage or by means
of a formula. There is also a “rule of thumb” stating that the costs to be levied on a
fishery do not exceed 10% of the port price of that fishery’s fish for that year (Mace,
pers. comm 15.10.2006). Consultation on procurement of most marine research is
open to all stakeholders, whereas consultation on cost recovery processes is restricted
to commercial stakeholder organisations (CSOs) and the Ministry. Stakeholder par-
ticipation in management fora varies widely, and in research fora it is dominated by
scientific representatives from NIWA and the fishing industry. As observed, deep water
fisheries are distinct from “shared fisheries” in that they lack recreational and Maori
customary extraction. Representation by non-industry interest groups in deep-water
scientific fora is usually restricted to occasional appearances by one or at most two
ENGO representatives.23
3.2 A Brief History
Prior to the advent of the QMS, New Zealand’s fisheries were managed under a some-
what primitive combination of limited-entry licenses and input controls.24 There was
little research undertaken,25 but when in the 1960s foreign fishing activity alerted New
Zealand to its under-utilisation of its offshore fisheries resources the government be-
gan encouraging expansion of the fishing industry.26 Fisheries management and re-
search became more organised with the creation of the Marine Department and its
Fisheries Research Division, but research was restricted by the small size of the Di-
vision’s research vessel, the James Cook. Government development initiatives saw
huge increases both in vessel numbers27 and catches,28 but particularly in the deep
water, research was essentially racing fishing effort to ascertain BMSY before the in-
dustry fished past it.29 However the signs of overexploitation were already unmissable
in the inshore fisheries, and by the 1980s over-capitalisation was also evident despite
attempts to rein in fishing effort.30
23Anon (2004-2005)
24Straker et al. (2002)
25Nightingale (1992)
26Sharp (1997)
27Sharp (1997)
28Straker et al. (2002)
29(Cullen and Memon, 1990; Johnson, 2004)
30(Cullen and Memon, 1990; Ministry of Fisheries, 1996)
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Contraction and a new regime
By 1982 industry over-capitalisation, fuelled by government assistance, was severe
The licensing and registry regime was also causing a huge transaction cost burden.31
The government seized two main policy tools to remedy the situation: fleet reduc-
tion and a new management paradigm of property rights in fish. The fleet reduction
policies managed to remove small fishers and reduced the administrative burden, but
at significant social and economic cost, particularly to Maori.32 The new property
rights scheme was successfully trialled as a prototype with a resource rental in the
relatively new deep-water fisheries in 1983, with a view to extending it to inshore fish-
eries. In 1984 the new fisheries policy was announced, based on ITQs and ACEs and
designed to promote efficient utilisation, value-maximisation and a stewardship ethic
in fishers.33 The associated per-tonnage resource rental was also a multi-goal policy
tool. It was designed to return some of the economic rent from fisheries to the pub-
lic, offset the government’s fisheries management costs, and buffer the risk burden the
government adopted by using quota trading to adjust catch levels.34 The government
would tender for surrender of quota (and eventually buy and sell them) from industry
to effect changes in TACs, which were mostly large reductions due to the extensive
over-exploitation. Sharp writes that the period 1983-86, during which the new poli-
cies were being debated, saw the original bold reductions in TAC whittled away until
“. . . with few exceptions, the proposed TAC [had] increased over this period”.35 In
light of the meager existing science on target species, which was nevertheless able to
show over-exploitation of many stocks, the failure to achieve any decreases in catch to
accompany the new regime did not bode well for sustainability.
Stumbling blocks
Catch reductions The need for essential catch reductions quickly made the govern-
ment’s quota trading activity very expensive.36 This plus the potential politicisation
of TACC adjustments motivated the government to shift the risk burden of fisheries
fluctuations onto resource users. The 1986 Fisheries Amendment Act changed ITQs
from fixed tonnages to percentages of a stock’s TACC, with market compensation for
reductions.
31Straker et al. (2002)
32Cullen and Memon (1990)
33Straker et al. (2002); Sinner and Fenemor (2005)
34Clark et al. (1988); McClurg (2000)
35Sharp (1997, page 513)
36Sissenwine and Mace (1992)
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Maori rights
The way the new fisheries management policy had sidelined Maori was the source of
considerable resentment, and the government’s collection of a resource rental for fish
(an exercise of sovereign rights guaranteed to Maori under the Treaty) was a particular
insult. After two landmark court cases, the Court of Appeal forced the government to
halt the implementation of the QMS pending reports on Treaty of Waitangi claims by
the Waitangi Tribunal. Further judicial recognition of Maori fisheries rights under the
Treaty of Waitangi forced the government to settle Treaty claims in order to complete
the QMS’s implementation.37 This was done via the 1989 Maori Fisheries Act and
the ground-breaking settlement deal for indigenous fisheries rights enacted in the 1992
Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Settlement) Act. This provided for a transfer of new
ITQs to Maori and for development of Maori fishing capacity.38 (For a comprehensive
examination of the settlement, see Guth 2001).
Science-based management?
Science-based deep-water fisheries management in New Zealand has had a patchy his-
tory. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the initial huge catches of orange roughy
were diminishing fast; the species’ “bankrolling of the New Zealand fishing indus-
try”39 had come to an end.40 The original biological estimates of roughy productivity
were flimsy indeed, based on international defaults in the absence of information, but
the species’ aggregation behaviour had allowed the fact that the estimates were quite
inappropriate to remain hidden by high catches.41 By 1988, however, following an ex-
perimental rise in one fishery’s quota (adaptive management was formally introduced
in 199142), the level of depletion had revealed itself as grave indeed.43 When the
government moved in 1988 to make roughy ITQs proportional rather than tonnages,
proposing significant TAC reductions without compensation, the industry challenged
it in court seeking almost $130 million in damages.44 In order to forestall further liti-
gation,45 the government negotiated an out-of-court settlement whereby compensation
was payable for TAC reductions for five years, during which time decreases would be
effected incrementally in three fisheries while the fourth’s TAC would be doubled in
37Boast (1990)
38Memon and Cullen (1996)
39Johnson (2004, page 407)
40Annala et al. (2003)
41Sissenwine and Mace (1992)
42Holdsworth (2004)
43Clark (2001)
44McClurg (2000)
45Straker et al. (2002)
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an adaptive management experiment.46
In 1988, the fishing industry contracted scientists from the Imperial College of
London to re-assess the orange roughy stock assessment. In 1990 the University of
Washington became the industry’s preferred science provider and have produced alter-
native stock assessments and second opinions ever since.47
The QMS: financial burden
The early 1990s were a difficult period for the new fisheries management system.
Orange roughy had shone a spotlight on the scientific foundations of the QMS and
found them to be shaky, inshore stocks were not recovering, and recreational fishers
had been largely ignored by fisheries policy.48 Resource rentals were being vocifer-
ously protested by industry groups in court and out, and fundamentally challenged
by Maori (who were also legally entitled to a substantial compensation package). The
self-funding ability of the QMS had failed to materialise; Pearse wrote in a 1992 review
of fisheries policy that fisheries were in fact “. . . a substantial net loss to Treasury”, and
recommended cost recovery instead of resource rentals,49 a conclusion echoed by the
1991 review of fisheries legislation.50 In 1992, Cabinet decided to employ the “avoid-
able cost” principle to calculate the quantum of costs payable by the industry. This
was defined as “[a]ll expenditure that arises purely as a consequence of the existence
of commercial fishing should be recovered from the industry. In addition, some non-
avoidable costs which are ‘jointly’ shared by the commercial and non-commercial
sectors, such as research, should be chargeable to the industry, in recognition of the
degradation of non-commercial values as a result of commercial exploitation”.51 En-
vironmental groups were among non-industry stakeholders who resisted the change
to attributable cost, arguing that the “return to the nation” aspect of avoidable cost
was essential.52 However following vociferous lobbying by industry groups, Cabinet
agreed in February 1994 to a reduced version of avoidable cost whereby government
would bear a larger percentage of non-avoidable costs.53
Funding and management reform
The 1994 Fisheries Amendment Act provided for cost recovery, abolished resource
rentals, and transformed the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) into a Min-
46Hilborn (2006)
47Maunder and Starr (2002)
48Ministry of Fisheries (1997)
49Pearse and Walters (page 1992, page 15)
50Fisheries Task Force (1992)
51Ministry of Fisheries (page 1997, page 14)
52Environment and Conservation Organisations of Aotearoa New Zealand (ECO) (2007)
53Ministry of Fisheries (1997, page 18)
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istry of Fisheries (responsible for fisheries policy) and a CRI (NIWA), with staffing
reductions of around 40% in the latter transition.54 Cost recovery was the subject of
ongoing skirmishes over the “attributable or avoidable” joint cost issue,55 while the
quantum of funds recovered gradually dropped. Stokes, Gibbs and Holland (2006)
write that it was intended to decrease over time as the efficiency of service delivery
improved and industry acquired responsibility for services.56 In contrast, Wallace and
Weeber (2003) write that “the total to be paid [was being] whittled down under intense
pressure from the industry, shrinking well below what the government expected”.57
The new Fisheries Amendment Act (passed in two parts in 1995 and 1996) introduced
a sweep of major reforms. One of these was the finalisation of the division of the old
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries into a policy unit (the modern Ministry of Fish-
eries) and a separate commercially-driven science provider (NIWA). The 1996 Act
also included fisheries management novelties such as “sustainability” (section 8), a
requirement to consider the marine environment (section 9), and a version of the pre-
cautionary principle (section 10). These were responses to New Zealand’s domestic
legislative trends in environmental management (such as the Resource Management
Act (1991)) as well as new international obligations.58 The 1996 Act also provided
new rules for cost recovery in Part 14, but the continued lack of “. . . shared theoretical
base or understanding of cost recovery between the Ministry and stakeholders”59 saw
court proceedings initiated to base cost recovery on “attributable cost”. This essentially
provides that the industry only be charged for services from which they have benefited,
rather than for the costs its operation imposes as avoidable cost provides.60 A 1996
Select Committee review of cost recovery saw the proceedings (and a later threat to
withhold levies) withdrawn but the regime and its uncertainties were the source of
ongoing acrimony between industry and government.61
Policy development and trends
New Zealand’s marine management has evolved greatly since 1996, but the following
developments are particularly significant for this study. The Ministry produced the
“Fisheries 2010” document in 1997 to complement the Ministry for the Environment’s
“Environment 2010”, which set overall goals for New Zealand’s environmental man-
54Nightingale (1992, page 241)
55McClurg (2000, page 4)
56Stokes et al. (2006, page 12)
57Wallace and Weeber (2003, page 11)
58Including the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), the Rio Declaration (1992) and the Agree-
ment for the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
(1995).
59Ministry of Fisheries (1997, page 10)
60Ministry of Fisheries (1997, page 6)
61McClurg (2000); Wyatt (2000)
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agement.62 In 1998 the Ministry produced “Strategic Framework and Directions for
Fisheries Research Contracted by the Ministry of Fisheries”, but it was followed in
1999 by the Office of the Controller and Auditor-General’s review of the information
requirements for the sustainable management of fisheries, which found the Ministry’s
information provision lacking in many important respects.63 (A followup report in
2005 showed significant efforts had been made to remedy the problems but the QMS
still suffers from a chronic information deficit.64)
Devolution Co-management increased in prominence in fisheries policy for three
years, culminating in the 1999 Fisheries Amendment Act’s proposals for significant
devolution of fisheries management responsibility to industry.65 The Act also provided
for reducing the cost-recovery basis to “attributable cost”, both developments that were
fought strenuously by non-industry stakeholder groups.66 The move towards devolu-
tion was halted by a change of government and a Fisheries Minister (Pete Hodgson)
who appeared less willing to trust industry to wield devolved management power re-
sponsibly.67 However the process for devolving fisheries registry services was in train,
and continued until “FishServe”, an industry-run organisation, took full responsibility
in 2001; its success has since been hailed as a triumph for devolved management.68
In 2000 the Ministry was continuing to develop fisheries plans and standards for fish-
eries management (though this was proceeding too slowly for the Auditor-General’s
office69). Also in 2000 the Minister declared 18 areas within the EEZ to be closed to
bottom trawling and dredging,70 and launched the initial phases of the Oceans Policy.
In 2001, 12 environmental performance indicators were finalised to assess fish stocks
and the state of the marine environment.71 Also in 2001, the hoki fishery received
Marine Stewardship Council sustainable fishery certification (a development which
has sparked both elation72 and disappointment73). In the same year, the government
62Fisheries 2010’s twelve goals are: Inter-generational Equity; Biodiversity; Environmental Bottom
Lines; The Precautionary Principle; Research, Science and Technology; Protecting our International
Competitiveness; Sustainable Property Rights; Least-cost Policy Tools; Pricing of Infrastructure; Inter-
nalisation of External Environmental Costs; Defining the Limits of Fishery Resource Use and Substitu-
tion; and Social Costs and Benefits.
63Office of the Auditor-General (1999)
64Office of the Auditor-General (2005)
65Yandle (2003)
66Burstall (1998); Environment and Conservation Organisations of Aotearoa New Zealand (ECO)
(1999)
67The Hon. Pete Hodgson (2000)
68Soboil and Craig (2006)
69Office of the Auditor-General (2005)
70Ministry of Fisheries (2007b)
71Office of the Auditor-General (2005)
72Clement (2000)
73Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society (2004)
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published the results of its consultation on the Oceans Policy, which showed that New
Zealanders had a strong relationship with the seas and some strong views about marine
environmental management.74
Section 10 in the courts In 2002 the Minister established an Oceans Secretariat to
rejuvenate the Oceans Policy process, instructing it to swiftly deliver a policy.75 Also
in 2002, the first of a series of legal cases testing section 10(a) of the Act was brought.
Misapplication of theMALFiRM bycatch model76 and outdated economic information
in a Ministry report recommending a regional set-net ban to protect Hector’s dolphins
meant the decision was returned to the Minister under judicial review. In 2003, the
industry won an injunction against a proposed closure of a squid fishery to protect
sealions, on the basis that gaps between observed and projected bycatch mortality
prevented the Minister from assessing the balance between the Purpose and section
15 (protection of marine mammals). In 2004, the Court of Appeal held that while a
precautionary approach to the balancing of utilisation and its effect was reasonable,
the Minister must still use the best available information. With a preponderance of
evidence in favour of greater utilisation, the MFish’s uniquely low sealion mortality
threshold for that year breached s10(a).
Environmental developments
Following its presence at the Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in 2001,
the Ministry signalled the desirability of ecosystem-based fisheries management, but
was very aware of the immediate needs of single-stock sustainability.77 This has re-
mained a significant sticking-point, especially given the greater expense of even mini-
malist ecosystem-based management.78 2005 saw the launch of the Strategy for Man-
aging the Environmental Effects of Fishing (the SMEEF) which provides for the setting
of environmental standards. However standards must be preceded by “identif[ication]
of the New Zealand government’s obligations”,79 and the new higher emphasis on
ecosystems requires much more information.80 Some draft standards for fisheries
management were released for discussion in late 2006 for several sections in Part I of
the Fisheries Act; a management goal hierarchy to contextualise the standards is due
to be released in November this year. Also in 2006, on the heels of an international
conference over bans on bottom trawling, the government accepted a proposal from
74Ministry of Fisheries (2001a)
75Peart (2005)
76Maximum Allowable Level of Fishing-Related Mortality
77Ministry of Fisheries (2001b)
78Mace (2001)
79Ministry of Fisheries (2006c, page 7)
80Ministry of Fisheries (2006c)
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the fishing industry (the Benthic Protection Area Accord or BPA Accord). This pro-
vides for closing 30% of the EEZ’s area to bottom trawling to protect the environment,
in exchange for a cap on cost-recovery for deep-water benthic research (one-third of
the total costs81) and restrictions on the Ministry’s power to institute further closures
within the EEZ,82 and is now incorporated in a Memorandum of Understanding with
the Deep Water Stakeholders’ Group. However it was criticised as a missed opportu-
nity to achieve substantial protection of benthic environments.83 The Ministry is also
in the process of developing a Benthic Impacts Strategy.84 Another recent development
was the Shared Fisheries proposal, which has elicited active and vocal participation
from Maori, commercial and recreational stakeholders over suggested re-allocations
of limited inshore stocks.85
Fisheries Amendment Bill 2007: precaution realigned?
The Bill proposes to amend section 10 of the Act, directing decision-makers not to
let uncertainty prevent them from taking steps to achieve sustainability (rather than
to achieve the Act’s purpose of sustainable utilisation). This has been a fascinating
showcase of stakeholders’ normative and descriptive views of the Ministry of Fish-
eries’ roles and performance. ENGOs support the Bill, seeking to strengthen further
the protective nature of the proposed provision.86 Industry groups are unanimous in
their opposition of the Bill, founded on their opposition to realigning the precaution-
ary direction towards sustainability. They argue that there are sufficient environmental
protection provisions in the rest of the Fisheries Act and in international law to inform
section 10, and that the proposed principle will be a shield for reduced transparency
and a prop for otherwise unjustifiable decisions on the part of the Ministry.87 As was
reflected in this research, the industry feels that the Ministry already engages in in-
appropriate environmental advocacy, and changing section 10(a) will only open the
floodgates. There were also fears that the seafood industry will be used as a “cash
cow” to fill the gaps in the public good science base left by years of under-funding,
and that the new provision will be used to justify cutting TACs because of uncertain
information while preventing research that would enable gaps in that information to
be filled.88 Green groups, in contrast, feel that the Ministry is currently too rash in
81Ministry of Fisheries (2007e)
82Ministry of Fisheries (2007b,c)
83Leathwick et al. (2006, page 28)
84Ministry of Fisheries (2006b)
85Hapi (2007); Option4 (2007)
86Environment and Conservation Organisations of Aotearoa New Zealand (ECO) (2007); Greenpeace
(2007)
87New Zealand Seafood Industry Council (2007); Ltd (2007)
88New Zealand Seafood Industry Council (2007)
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its marine management decisions, and that changing the law can only improve those
decisions.89 The Minister himself stated: “I want to amend the Act so it is absolutely
crystal clear that sustainability is the priority and no lawyer or court can cast any doubt
on it. Sustainability is too important for us to be in any doubt about its priority. What
I want is for us to agree that sustainability is the bottom line and to make this clear in
section 10 so the lack of information is not used as a reason to delay taking measures
to protect fisheries.”90 This “environmental bottom line” attitude was also expressed
from a Maori perspective by the Greens’ fisheries and Maori affairs spokeswoman,91
but contrasts with the Maori perspective presented by the Maori Party’s co-leaders
which was consistent with the fishing industry’s view.92
3.3 Conclusion
To conclude, New Zealand’s marine resource management is in a state of flux. Some
believe the QMS has actually become the management system for New Zealand’s ma-
rine resources.93 The legislative framework for transferable quota has many aspects in
need of policy and statutory development, notably the environmental principles. The
New Zealand public has not had enough opportunity (and perhaps lacks the volition) to
express its preferences for the long-term, large-scale management of the nation’s ma-
rine resources. Meanwhile, the policy framework itself sports a number of initiatives
which have had a visible effect on practical management (such as the SMEEF and the
BPA Agreement), but also has many measures which are in their early developmental
stages. These have the potential to make a great contribution to improving cohesion
and coherence of marine and fisheries management, but they are not sufficiently ad-
vanced to contribute at present.
The QMS has expanded to include 97 of the 130 commercially-fished species,
and the Act’s environmental principles require the effects of fishing these species on
the wider marine environment to be reduced or avoided. However fisheries research
budgets have not expanded in harmony, so many of the species are managed under
section 10’s precautionary approach as information (scientific or otherwise) is deficient
or absent. This provision is the source of great contention, and has been earmarked
by the Minister for amendment to push management under uncertainty in favour of
sustainability rather than sustainable utilisation.
Meanwhile, fisheries research is procured by the Ministry for deep water species
89Environment and Conservation Organisations of Aotearoa New Zealand (ECO) (2007); Greenpeace
(2007)
90The Rt Hon Jim Anderton (2007)
91Turei (2007)
92Sharples and Turia (2007)
93Johnson (2004, page 370)
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via a combination of cost-recovery and government funding, with a near-monopoly
on independent research provision and a duopsony for its purchase. In the fora where
research decisions are made, scientific representatives from the fishing industry, who
(along with NIWA and MFish scientists) comprise the great majority of representa-
tion. One or at most two lay representatives from ENGOs are occasionally present,
(in the deep water fora non-commercial Maori interests are almost never represented).
In these fora, decision-making (particularly under uncertainty, which is omnipresent
in the deep water arena) is characterised by a shifting frontier between hard-science-
based and value-based decisions. Where hard science is dominant, scientists debate
the validity of assumptions and conclusions drawn from the limited data available. As
values become more influential in decision-making, the legitimacy of these determina-
tions is often disputed by industry and ENGO representatives.
32 CHAPTER 3. NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT
Chapter 4
Conceptual Framework
4.1 Introduction
This section is the conceptual framework in light of which interview results will be
examined. To understand how normative and positive information, science and pol-
icy, and individual and institutional elements interact in New Zealand fisheries science
fora, an awareness is necessary of the different forces to which the scientists in these
fora are subject. The focus of the non-scientific drivers is on government agents be-
cause of the New Zealand government’s ultimate responsibility for sustainably man-
aging the country’s fisheries, and its mandate to run processes procuring and using
fisheries science to that end.
This chapter is therefore divided into two sections, canvassing the pressures ex-
erted on the different scientists, particularly fisheries scientists, and the pressures on
government agents.
4.2 Good Scientific Practice: Professional Excellence
For a scientist acting in his or her professional capacity, professional standards (what
constitutes being a good scientist) are the primary consideration for guiding decisions.
These are defined principally by the scientific method, the series of founding princi-
ples that distinguishes science as a way of acquiring and refining knowledge about
phenomena. The provision of scientific information (“these are the characteristics of
this phenomenon”) is clearly distinguished from the provision of any subsequent pol-
icy information (“this is what should be done about it”). New Zealand’s scientific and
policy advice processes for fisheries management are in this mould. Policy-making,
via the “sustainability rounds” of meetings, involves assessment of factors such as eco-
nomic, social and cultural value, subjective considerations which (while assessed via
professional analysis) are deliberately excluded from pure scientific investigation.
33
34 CHAPTER 4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The literature distinguishes scientific methods from other methods of inquiry as
being based on collection of measurable, observable evidence by repeatable, docu-
mented observation and experiment, and on analysis of this evidence according to
certain principles of reasoning.1 The essential value of this approach is its minimisa-
tion of subjectivity in the conclusions: the results of a good scientific investigation will
theoretically be the same regardless of who performs the research. A scientific conclu-
sion is therefore interpreted as being objective, accurately describing a phenomenon
and being the “truth” — or at least as close to all these as it is possible for society to
come.2 The scientific community advances knowledge by building on the conclusions
of past research in an iterative process of critique, discussion, and extension in pursuit
of originality.3
4.2.1 Good scientific practice: foundation of science’s authority
The scientific community plays a critical role in quality-checking, via peer review,
scientists’ procedural and analytical robustness. The considerable expertise required
to assess scientific performance means laypeople must put their trust in the scien-
tific community as a reliable judge of analytical quality.4 Non-scientists trust that
this community’s dedication to professionalism will uphold and enforce the canons of
scientific practice, so that scientists’ pronouncements on issues are the products of sci-
entific and technical opinion rather than non-scientific considerations such as personal
norms. Peer-reviewed journals and their various reputations are used as indicators that
research has met certain technical standards, and that scientists are held in regard by
their peers.
The weight of scientific numbers
The role of scientific “consensus”, or majority scientific opinion, is a critical concept.
In Western society generally, laypeople take an overwhelming majority amongst rele-
vant, respected scientific experts in support of a certain scientific hypothesis to mean
that this statement is, for practical purposes, “the truth” or as near to it as society can
reasonably get.5
Scientists’ professional opinions on the degree to which the results of study A
mean that conclusion Y is the “truth” vary because of their different stances on tech-
nical components of the issue. For example, Study A (which might be sampling a
population of fish) returns a result that suggests the total population has biomass of
1Newton (1972); Veblen (1906)
2Godfey-Smith (2003); Nola and Sankey (2007)
3Polanyi (1962)
4Merton (1973); Bloor (1976)
5Godfey-Smith (2003)
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size y. Depending on relevant population scientists’ views of the accuracy of the sam-
pling method, and of the relative influence of the population variables (such as preda-
tion, habitat conditions, food availability, the previous year’s recruitment), they might
interpret Study A’s result as showing a total population size of anywhere from compar-
atively small (y−1) through to comparatively large (y+1). Disagreement will likely
ensue as the various experts critique the original Study A conclusion of population
size y, arguing the relative merits of their interpretive approaches. This is the quality-
checking role of the scientific community — to test from every angle the robustness
of the conclusion claimed from Study A. Scientific pluralism is useful here, as many
scientists’ different critiques can highlight the different areas of potential weakness in
the original analysis. (By informing further iterations of the technique, methodologies
are improved via gradual minimisation of subjective influences.)
However, a non-expert who wants to know what Study A means cannot distinguish
the merits of the different positions across the interpretive spectrum.6 A flat “popula-
tion distribution” of the experts across the spectrum of views from y−1 to y+1 with-
out any clustering around one conclusion (lacking any consensus) means that science
provides little additional information, because the layperson is left with several appar-
ently equally valid but very different conclusions. For practical purposes, therefore,
it is necessary to have the largest possible population of expert scientists critiquing
and expressing their views on a study’s conclusion, so that a normal distribution can
be discerned, the extreme “tails” discounted, and the expert population’s clear mean
for interpretations of Study A (for example at “total population = (y+ 0.2)”) can be
identified and taken as the “truth”.7
4.2.2 Scientific method: the Way to the Truth?
However there is a significant element of faith in this assumption. The relationship
between adherence to scientific method and the discovery of “the truth”, or knowledge
and understanding of the world’s phenomena as they “really are”, has long been pas-
sionately debated. The controversy over the inductive reasoning that allows a tested
hypothesis to be accepted as universal (always holding true under those circumstances)
intensified in the 1960s. Karl Popper’s (1959) position that scientific methods falsify
rather than verify hypotheses8 (as the logical positivist tradition espoused9) joined that
of Michael Polyani, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos10 in fuelling
the debate over the scientific method’s status as the only pathway to objective “truth”.
6Weber and Word (2001)
7Fleck (1975)
8Popper (1959)
9Suppe (1977)
10Polanyi (1958); Kuhn (1970); Feyerabend (1975); Lakatos (1976)
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The ongoing conflict, flaring in the 1990s in the “Science Wars”,11 was (and remains)
a reaction to the epistemological hegemony that pure science has enjoyed since the En-
lightenment, to the detriment of other academic disciplines and non-scientific forms of
knowledge.12
Limitations on truth-finding power
This debate helped to articulate the limitations on the natural sciences’ usefulness for
describing objective phenomena, and those most relevant to the fisheries management
problem are as follows.
The scientist’s disinterestedness is a cornerstone of objectivity and therefore of sci-
ence’s status as a pathway to the truth. Merton (1973) described it as one of the five
fundamental principles of science.13 However, disinterestedness has two significant
limitations. The first is the impossibility of scientists, as human beings, being able to
exclude entirely their personal world-views, values, hopes and other subjective, nor-
mative influences from their analysis.14 This was a strong theme in the Science Wars’
debates,15 which drew on a rising tide of sociology- and philosophy-based thought
(see below) examining the interplay between innate and socially-acquired components
of individual people’s preferences and behavioural motivators.
The second limitation is that scientists need to be paid, and funding is a power-
ful challenge to disinterestedness. While at the extremes it is clear where science is
being subsumed beneath a non-scientific interest,16 it is difficult to discern the bound-
ary between legitimate scientific and technical positions on an issue and illegitimate
ones driven by non-scientific considerations such as money (for convenience, labelled
“positioning” in this thesis). This is particularly so under uncertainty, where a wide
spectrum of equally legitimate scientific conclusions can be drawn from the same data.
Establishing whether a scientist is biased (his or her professional opinions show “a
[. . . ] persistent discrepancy in a politically relevant direction”17 is particularly diffi-
cult where scientific uncertainty is high.
Government-funded science is acknowledged as being less vulnerable to results-
driven commercial pressures,18 in recognition of governments’ obligation to pursue the
11The Science Wars was an intellectual conflict fought in the 1990s in the academic literature between
two groups, one questioning the objectivity of the scientific method from a wide variety of angles (includ-
ing post-modernism, feminism, ethnology, sociology), and the other arguing that objective knowledge
exists and the scientific method is the best approach to it. (1996) for a contemporary overview.
12Ravetz (1979); Hill (1984); Ravetz (1990); Gross and Levitt (1994); Sokal and Bricmont (1998)
13Merton (1973)
14Brown (1995); Charles (1998); Ihde (2002)
15Parsons (2001)
16Aron et al. (2002)
17Roll-Hansen (1994)
18Easton (1989); Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (1992); Callon (1994); Hammond and
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greater public interest (which includes full accountability and disclosure of spending).
New Zealand’s public service restructuring in the late 1980s and early 1990s in pursuit
of greater efficiency decreased the ratio of government to “user pays” funding in the
science system, a move that many felt compromised its ability to produce good-quality,
objective science.19
Effects of context on science
Another caution against believing science to be entirely value-free is that the ends
to which scientific research will be used often mean that ostensibly value-neutral
scientific technicalities can have significant distributive effects. Given the scientific
method’s preference for Type I over Type II errors,20 the placement of a heavy burden
of proof is very important in situations where potential harm would be wide-spread
but potential benefits would be concentrated.21 Environmental impacts from industrial
technologies are an example. Scientists’ extreme specialisation, and their common de-
mographic characteristics, may mean they are generally less able to see their subject
area in a wider societal perspective.22 Because of their more generalist view, those
seeking to use science in policy have a significant responsibility to account for burden
of proof influences when commissioning scientific inquiry.
A final caution against expecting too much from science for practical decision-
making is the aforementioned effect of high uncertainty. A population of relevant
experts scattered across the spectrum of interpretive positions regarding the same data
prevents non-scientists from identifying a majority expert opinion that can be taken
as the “truth” for practical purposes. In such situations science therefore fails to
contribute significantly to society’s understanding of the phenomenon, because non-
scientific considerations must be employed to choose what the “truth” will be taken
to be. It also means that it is extremely difficult to distinguish a scientist’s position
on an issue is based solely on scientific and technical preferences or partially on non-
scientific bases, such as norms generated by the individual scientist’s values or by an
institution such as an employer company. Scientific pluralism provides a useful con-
tribution to understanding an issue if the population of relevant experts describes a
normal distribution, which covers a wide spectrum of views but most importantly has
an identifiable “majority” position.
Devine (1994)
19Easton (1989); Cartner and Bollinger (1997); Edmeades (2004)
20Scientists are more willing to make false negative mistakes (variable A has no effect on variable B)
than false positives (variable A has an effect on variable B).(Lemons, 1998)
21Lemons (1996); Shrader-Frechette (2006)
22Dahl (1966)
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4.2.3 Science is fallible, but still dominates
The issues at the root of the Science Wars’ conflicts — how objective science can
genuinely be, and the role of social construction of knowledge — remain unresolved.
Authors such as Bent Flyvbjerg (2001) have offered reconciliations emphasising the
different strengths of scientific and non-scientific analysis, and the necessity of both
for advancing societies’ knowledge of the world.23 This is slowly becoming acknowl-
edged, particularly in policy circles,24 and some blending is visible in the boundaries
between the disciplinary territories (discussed further below). Amongst the general
public, the mystery and authority of science has been somewhat eroded in recent
decades, particularly by the politically motivated cultivation of high-profile scientific
dissent on issues such as climate change,25 and the social sciences are experiencing an
associated increase in exposure.
However, the natural or “pure” sciences’ epistemological dominance persists, par-
ticularly in fields such as fisheries which have an acknowledged objective component
to the information required to deal with them.26 This hegemony is partially perpetuated
by academic journals’ inherent conservatism and the way they provide society with
an easily-interpreted signal of scientific professional achievement.27 The much more
regularised and institutionalised nature of biologists’ and ecologists’ contributions to
fisheries knowledge make it much easier for decision-makers to find “reputable” infor-
mation than for the social sciences (see Fisheries science section), and New Zealand is
no exception.
4.2.4 Modernising forces on science
However, the dynamism of modern society may force acceleration in the paradigm
shift towards a new multi-disciplinary approach to gathering knowledge of the world.
The development of industrialised societies has created situations where uniquely large
risks, for which responsibility has become difficult to attribute, are a feature of every-
day life — Ulrich Beck’s “risk society”.28 “Manufactured risk”29 in natural resource
management means human activities court far-reaching consequences such as species
extinction and climate change,30 while uncertainty31 and ignorance are both rife.32
23Flyvbjerg (2001)
24Howes (2005)
25See for example(2003)
26Weeks and Packard (1997); Ebbin (2004); Degnbol et al. (2006)
27Longino (1990); Anthony (2006)
28Beck (1992)
29Giddens (1999)
30Guha (2000)
31Wynne (1991)
32Risk societies have developed in response to the uniquely large risks (such as “manufactured risk”)
brought about by modernisation, and most (though by no means exclusively) faced by developed nations.
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Where complex natural phenomena are crucial to human life, gravely threatened by
ongoing human action and persistently under-valued by both leaders and the public in
general, society’s information-gathering and decision-making systems are acid-tested.
Scientists are being increasingly called on to provide some solidity and objectivity in
politically fraught situations where decision-makers see an objective component such
as an environmental bottom line contrasting with an intimidating tangle of subjective
positions. Scientists then come under pressure (often from themselves33) to step out-
side the pure science domain and give policy advice.34
However, orthodox scientific training focuses on excluding subjective influences as
completely as possible from one’s professional purview,35 and this means scientists are
particularly likely to handle poorly the more subjective elements of policy decisions
such as social, cultural, economic and political considerations.36
Attempted “fixes” for orthodox science
The desire for the unequivocal solidity of traditional “hard” science, coupled with
steadily increasing acknowledgement of its limitations for solving increasingly diffi-
cult real-life issues, has seen the development of some new types of science and new
approaches to using it.37
While there is intense debate over the operational detail and merits of interdisci-
plinarity38 the arguments from the sociologists, political scientists and philosophers of
science inspired by Popper, Kuhn and their intellectual descendants have taken root.
In the policy arena, best practice pushes for multi-disciplinarity of information-
gathering to improve both the substance and the democratic credentials of the resulting
policy decisions.39 Decision rules such as the precautionary principle are becoming
widespread, as policy-makers attempt to ensure scientific inquiries are pointed in the
Giddens 1999 describes risk societies as “increasingly preoccupied with the future and . . . safety”, and
struggling to cope with the fact that many of the risks they face have been brought about by people rather
than by natural forces. Ulrich Beck 1992 uses the term “crisis of responsibility” to describe how the in-
sulation of human activity from its effects (such as those on the environment) has led many manufactured
risk to be seen to be no-one’s fault in particular.
33Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1996); Myers (1999); Winterton (2003)
34Brouha (1993); Meffe et al. (1998); Senkowsky (2004)
35Wagner (2001); Aron et al. (2002); Hilborn (2006)
36Bowen (1997); Ebbin (2004); Lach et al. (2003); Taylor (2004)
37Salwasser (1993); Gibbons et al. (1994); Weible et al. (2004); Younger et al. (2005). One of the
most significant trends is inter-disciplinarity, where both natural and social scientists are influenced by
each others’ methodological strengths and the resulting research has positive emergent properties. (Klein,
2007) Practically, inter-disciplinarity (and even the less merging multi-disciplinarity (Tress et al., 2006))
demands significant changes to traditional scientific practice, extending to institutional and social struc-
tures. (Metzger and Zare, 1999; Lattuca, 2001)
38Brewer (1999); Garrett-Jones et al. (2005)
39Stone (1989); Rochefort and Cobb (1993)
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right direction40 so that the policy they inform is “roughly right rather than precisely
wrong”.41 This will be discussed further below. One vehicle for effecting this change
is “post-normal science”,42 which will be a useful concept for this analysis. Adaptive
management is an example of a practical (though limited) tool for dealing with un-
certainty, though as yet it does not take post-normal science’s strong inter-disciplinary
approach.43
Inter- and multi-disciplinarity have been argued to constitute a significant paradigm
shift for science, but one which different disciplines and institutions are embracing
with varying enthusiasm.44 Kuhn’s examinations of paradigm change in science45 ar-
gue that in the transition period between paradigms, where the new and the established
temporally overlap but are both structurally weak, a sort of paradigmatic vacuum is
created. At such a time, scientists are subject to a wide variety of forces. The fol-
lowing section looks at fisheries science and identifies the paradigmatic conditions
currently operating.
4.2.5 Fisheries science: Formative decades
In fisheries science, the objective characteristics of the subject-matter mean that the
field has traditionally been dominated by natural sciences (principally biology, zool-
ogy and ecology). During the first, formative decades of its history, as MSY was gen-
erated with its roots in the fisheries theories of the 1930s46 and fish stock modelling
flourished in the post-war period,47 fisheries science was the domain of biologists and
mathematicians. Some authors argue that the 1950s have had a lasting reductionist
influence on fisheries science, resulting in fisheries managers clinging to single-stock
management and fisheries scientists being preoccupied with MSY.48
The human element of fisheries began to be considered in the 1950s, as “bioe-
40Beck (1996)
41Myers (1997)
42Post-normal science, a term coined by Funtowicz and Ravetz in the early 1990s, draws on Kuhn’s
1970 notion of paradigm shifts (when it becomes clear that “normal science” is gravely insufficient for
solving real-world problems and its underlying rules are called into question). Post-normal science is
designed for dealing with situations where the stakes are high and decisions are a one-shot game (each
choice will have significant consequences), values are in dispute, and facts are uncertain, of which cli-
mate change is the primary example. An extended peer community is a key aspect of post-normal science,
where those in the traditional scientific community recognise that orthodox science cannot fill the infor-
mation gaps preventing society from tackling the problem at hand. They therefore engage with experts
from outside the traditional scientific community whose information is necessary to solve the greater
problem at hand (Funtowicz and Ravets, 1990, 1993).
43Walters (1986); Guerin (2007)
44Yager (1996); Harriss (2002); Bruun et al. (2005)
45Kuhn (1970)
46Russell (1931); Graham (1935); Hile (1936)
47Ricker (1954); Schaefer (1954); Beverton and Holt (1957)
48Larkin (1977); Smith and Link (2005)
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conomics” factored fishers’ profits into analysis of stock sizes49 according to mainly
individual-based approaches.50 Trends in other fields, such as sociologically-driven
interest in societal institutions51 and citizen participation in politics52 caused ripples in
fisheries science. Two examples of this are Optimum Sustainable Yield (a short-lived
MSY with social objectives53) and adaptive management.54 However these were but
ripples, and by 1980 Francis lamented that “. . . over the past two or three decades most
of the advancement in fisheries science has occurred in the branches of this scientific
discipline rather than at the roots”. He prophesied danger if fisheries science con-
tinued to put the mathematical modelling “cart” before the fish stock and ecosystem
“horse’.55
Rude awakenings and methodological self-doubt
This prophesy seemed to be realised in the dramatic fish stock crashes of the 1980s
such as Atlantic cod and Pacific sardines. The crises “spawned a feeding-frenzy of in-
trospection” amongst fisheries scientists,56 whowere joined by sociologists, economists
and other academics, as the crashes’ socio-economic fallout focussed political atten-
tion on fisheries management and thereby on fisheries science.
This coincided with a trend of increasing academic attention to small community-
based resource management, including successful fisheries examples.57 These stood
in stark contrast to the fresh memories of centrally-managed fisheries crashes, and
began a strong literature stream advocating management devolution to fishing com-
munities.58
Turning a few points on the ocean liner’s wheel
The late 1980s and early 1990s also saw the entry of “sustainability” into the inter-
national political lexicon, via the 1987 Brundtland Report and the United Nations’
1992 Rio Declaration. Sustainability advocated policy pursuit of balance between hu-
man and natural systems, and included a distinct participatory democratic theme. It
coincided with the growing trend in the natural sciences towards more holistic analy-
49Anderson (1987)
50such as Gordon (1954); Scott (1955); Turvey (1964); Smith (1968)
51Scott and Coustalin (1995)
52Arnstein (see for example 1969); Frankena (see for example 1987)
53Larkin (1977)
54Holling (1978)
55Francis (1980, page 94)
56Longhurst (2006, page 107)
57McCay (see for example 1980); Ostrom (see for example 1990, 1992)
58Jentoft (1986); Berkes (1987); Pinkerton (1989); Vedsmand and Nielsen (1995); Sen and Nielsen
(1996)
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sis, emphasising ecosystem research, interconnections and emergent properties.59 The
field of fisheries management responded, if slowly, and ecosystem-based management
appeared in international agreements, such as the UN’s 1995 Straddling Stocks Con-
vention.60
In fisheries science, new models of fisheries analysis have also been developing,
such as ecosystem-based management,61 though this growth has still been in Francis’
branches of the discipline rather than its roots.62 Meanwhile, the spread of new tech-
nology has enabled fishing to extend into hitherto untouched areas such as the deep
ocean, which has created significant “manufactured risk” for both target stocks (such
as New Zealand orange roughy) and bycatch species.
Fisheries science is acknowledged as an essential input for governments that must
manage fisheries and other marine resources, particularly for those subject to manu-
factured risk. Fisheries scientists’ decisions in scientific fora are an integral part of the
New Zealand fisheries management process which is relied upon to produce the most
accurate picture of marine resources that can be achieved with available funding. The
following section looks at what particular additional pressures are exerted on govern-
ment agents in the execution of their role, which will inform examination of how New
Zealand’s fisheries management processes handle and digest science.
4.3 Forces Driving Government Agents
This section canvasses the kinds of forces driving government agents’ decision-making.
The pressures on government agents are canvassed both generally and specifically.
General pressures are the complex combinations of internally- and externally-generated
forces that drive individual humans’ behaviour, which apply equally to any person (in-
cluding scientists), while the specific pressures are those to which government agents
are subject in the course of their work.
4.3.1 Generic drivers for action
The question “what makes people behave as they do?” has inspired millennia of
thinkers and writers to investigate these phenomena, and to hotly debate their con-
clusions. A wide range of investigative approaches has generated similarly diverse re-
sults, varying according to the relative influence they accord to individuals’ internally-
generated drivers and to exogenous externally-sourced motivations.
59Grumbine (1994); Norgaard (1994); Simberloff (1998); Peuhkuri and Jokinen (1999)
60Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
61Link (2002a,b); Hall and Mainprize (2003); Pickitch et al. (2004)
62Anderson (1987); McGlade (1989); Caddy and Seijo (2005); Garcia (2005); Heron et al. (in press)
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Approaches emphasising the individual’s endogenous preferences as the key driver
of human behaviour owe much to economic theory, particularly neo-classical authors
such as Arrow (1951), Coase (1960), von Hayek (1960), Demsetz (1967) and Posner
(1977). Drawing on philosophers such as Locke (1690(1994), Smith (1776 (1937),
Bentham (1776 (1948) and Ricardo (1821), these approaches share an underlying con-
ception of society as composed of individuals pursuing innate or “natural” preferences.
In contrast, other schools of thought postulate that the greatest causative influence
on people’s behaviour is the institutions in which they live and operate, and any inves-
tigation of the drivers of an individual’s actions must focus on these institutions and
the forces they exert on people. “Institutions” in this sense uses Vatn’s (2005) defini-
tion63 which includes government bodies (and government as a whole), universities,
families, tribes, clubs, NGOs, companies and professional associations. The scientific
community, governments and companies are key institutions for this thesis. Tracing
their roots to philosophers such as Durkheim (1895 (1938), Marx (1867 (1970), Ve-
blen (1906) and Weber (1922 (1947), institution-centred schools of thought have more
recently drawn on sociology and psychology.64 The interplay between an individual
human’s autonomy and institutions’ authority has been heavily studied.65 Scott (1995)
provides an accessible history.66
Individual and institutional drivers
Untangling the multiple institutionally-generated and internally-generated forces driv-
ing a person’s actions can be a Herculean task. This thesis’ position is that a person’s
actions at any given point are directed by subtle combinations of the two, but that the
behavioural directions generated by some institutions (such as the scientific commu-
nity and the agency one works for) are more easily identifiable. The small size of the
New Zealand deep-water scientific fora means participants’ reactions to each other’s
behaviour vis-a`-vis shared institutions will likely be more visible.67 The literature
that looks at the variables determining whether people operating under an institution
choose to abide by its rules rather than pursuing a more individually-favourable path
(cooperate or defect) applies to a wide range of situations, including fisheries.68 Fur-
thermore, fisheries are inherently institutional phenomena at any scale,69 and the New
63“. . . the conventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of a society [that] . . . regularise life, sup-
port values and protect interests . . . [by] providing expectations, stability and meaning essential to human
existence.” Vatn (2005, page 60)
64Scott (1987)
65Selznick (1957); Le´vi-Strauss (1966); Berger and Luckmann (1967); Meyer and Rowan (1977); Par-
sons (1982)
66Scott (1995)
67Dawes et al. (1977)
68Olson (1965); Axelrod (1984); Grand (1997); Sethi and Somanathan (2001)
69Kooiman (2003); Jentoft (2004)
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Zealand deep-water fisheries that are this study’s focus are managed by nested institu-
tions with government as the over-arching unit.
4.3.2 What forces do government institutions exert on their agents?
Governments — large, powerful, enduring institutions — have been the subject of
much analysis, providing many models of the government / citizen relationship. Many
of these focus on the ways the power imbalance between the parties is maintained once
it is established.70
This thesis uses the “social contract” concept, acknowledging its underlying, sub-
conscious influence in modern democracies. With its roots drawing on philosophers
such as Hobbes, Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Emmanuel Kant, and rejuvenated
more recently by Rawls,71 its essence is that citizens obey their government’s laws
and rules (including paying taxes) “in exchange” for the government performing vital
services.72 The idea of the vote as the ultimate tool for “punishing” a government
that fails to perform its social-contractual duties is an important one, despite the theo-
retical status in of citizens’ rights to withhold civil obedience.73 (Interestingly, “user
pays” structures for public services (that featured conspicuously in the “new public
management” reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s) have created a visible “user
says” mentality in a relatively pure social-contractarian mode.74) It is at the root of the
professional obligations stipulated by public sector ethics, such as the State Services
Commission’s State Services Code of Conduct, recognising governments’ responsibil-
ity to govern well.75
Citizens’ obligations to government are clearly identifiable, specified in minute
detail in the letters of the law and enforced with the considerable coercive power of
government. What it means for the government to keep its side of the bargain is much
less clear, and even general rules (such as “do what’s best for everyone overall”) are
contested territory. Would a good government and a good government agent employ
a utilitarian, Bayesian approach76 or a Rawlsian “maximin” approach77 to assessing
“best”? Public sector ethics uses “the public interest”, which is itself a fraught term.78
70See for example Foucault (2000), Arendt (1958),and Habermas (1973).
71Hobbes (1651(1968); Locke (1690(1994); Rousseau (1762(1968); Kant (1784(1965); Rawls (1971)
72Boucher and Kelly (1994)
73Riley (1982)
74James (1991); Cartwright (2003)
75State Services Commission (2007)
76Harsanyi (1985)
77Rawls (1971)
78Dewey (1960); Flathman (1966); Meyer (1975)
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What should a government do vis-a`-vis natural resources?
Much of a government’s obligation revolves around distribution of the nation’s natural
resources amongst its citizens. Many valuable natural resources — including oceanic
fisheries — are non-excludable goods, and if they are used rivally equitable intra-
generational distribution is problematic. For conditionally renewable goods79, rival
extractive use can exhaust them and causes inter-general inequity. The “tragedy of the
commons” is where in the absence of use management, individuals exhaust a shared
natural resource.80 It is difficult for a manager to ensure that individuals’ uses of
a natural resource (such as marine species) achieve a socially-optimal distribution.81
The interconnectedness of natural resources means the indirect impacts of use, on
assets such as functional ecosystems,82 are also non-excludable. Property rights, the
management tool used in New Zealand, most often cover specific uses of a resource
rather than the full spectrum of effects,83 and environmental externalities84 are caused
by the exercise of the right.85
General obligations Management of people’s natural resource use, correcting the
market failures to which it is prone and effecting socially-desirable distributions of
natural assets, is a public good.86 There is considerable literature on the way people
weigh the transaction costs of management against its benefits,87 and choose man-
agement institutions such as various kinds of property rights. Distributive justice ar-
guments hold that where a management system causes the benefits of an activity are
enjoyed by a few and the costs (negative externalities) are borne by society, the burden
of proof to continue that activity should rest with the beneficiary.88 (In fisheries, the
working presumption is usually that the burden of proof is on those opposing fishing;
fishing can continue unless proven otherwise.89)
General principles such as equity and efficiency therefore provide some very broad
79These are only renewable if certain limits to renewal, such as minimum biological requirements
for reproduction, are respected. They cease to be renewable and will be exhausted if these limits are
surpassed.
80Hardin (1968)
81Leach et al. (1999)
82Holling (1978); Folke et al. (2002)
83Edwards and Steins (1999)
84An externality is an unintended and uncompensated effect on a third party to the use of the resource
Tietenberg (2000). This is also called “cost shifting”, where the benefits and costs of an activity are felt
by different groups of people.
85Daly and Farley (2004)
86Pigou (1920); Anscombe (1978); Sartorius (1981)
87Ostrom (see for example 1990); Bromley (see for example 1991); Schlager and Ostrom (see for
example 1992), and Feeny (1994); Hall (1998); Edwards and Steins (1999); Knight (2002); Libecap
(2003)
88Johnston (1994); Shrader-Frechette (2006); Leach et al. (1999); Caino and Niemann (2006)
89Dayton (1998); Campbell et al. (2000)
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rules of thumb for government agents seeking to do what’s best in natural resource
management. However beyond this there is considerable debate over “what’s best to
do”. Policy rules of thumb such as efficient use of effort and funding 90 guide how
governments pursue desired outcomes (and are assessed by watchdog agencies such
as New Zealand’s Auditor-General,91 but give little guidance on how to set policy
goals.92 For a government agent seeking to fulfil their professional responsibilities
by making fisheries management policy that pursues the public interest, there are two
sources of information to which they can turn to define what fisheries management
outcome would be “best”: they can turn to the citizens themselves, or they can turn to
a few experts. For convenience, these will be respectively labelled the “vox populi”
(voice of the people) and the “philosopher king” approaches, and will be examined in
turn.
The vox populi
The underlying notion of democracy, legitimising the coercive power that governments
exert over citizens, is that the elected government represents the “voice of the peo-
ple” and enacts their wishes; in other words, “what is best” is what citizens want.93
Economics has contributed much to this debate, by arguing that the best approach a
government can take is to set conditions that enable individual citizens to pursue what
they want (generally in the free market), which will most efficiently achieve optimal
(“the best”) resource distribution.94 Neo-classical economics inspired influential argu-
ments that government agents’ nature as individuals, motivated by the same rational
self-interest as any other human being,95 and emphasising the deleterious effects of
presuming that bureaucrats are possessed of any superior power to discern and effect
“what is best”.96
The legitimising power of participatory democracy — where citizens are involved
in the processes of government beyond simply voting — is testimony to the persistent
power of the vox populi as mandate.97 While for decades the “representative gov-
ernment” notion has been subject to trenchant deconstructions and theoretical siege
has been laid to it,98 it is still the most advertised source of governments’ mandate
to rule, particularly in election years.99 Public sector ethics holds that a government
90Young et al. (1996); Boston and Pallot (1997)
91Longstaff (1994); Sampford (1994)
92Ubel et al. (1996)
93Pitkin (1972); Grillo (1998); Urbinati (2006)
94Smith (1776 (1937); Libecap (2003); Stathakis and Vaggi (2006)
95Barnes (1995)
96See for example Buchanan and Tullock (1962); McKean (1965); Buchanan (1980)
97Smith (1993)
98Aleshire (1972); Hoggart (2000)
99Fredrickson (1994); Denhardt and Denhardt (2000)
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department’s mandate to make binding decisions is its manifestation of the vox populi,
expressed via an elected government’s policy, and pursuit of that policy must therefore
override any individual bureaucrat’s normative notions.100
Human limitations on the vox populi However the three-yearly vote is an extremely
blunt instrument for expressing what citizens want for specific issues such as natural
resource management,101 and “the people” rarely speak with one voice. While in
some situations, well-designed participation in rule-making procedure can legitimise
the eventual outcomes regardless of their consistency with interest groups’ wishes102
high-stakes decisions need specific information on what it is people want.103 How-
ever, populations’ heterogeneity, and the multifarious ways people value natural re-
sources,104 produce many diverse expressions of “what the public wants” for manag-
ing natural resources. (This is leaving aside the notion of intrinsic value in biota, as
discussed in Singer and Regan (1989), Nash (1989), Gregory et al (1993) and Routley
(1995).) People’s values in natural resources are communicated by a wide variety of
voices, which penetrate into the ears of government with varying success.105 Attempts
to improve government decision-making by increasing participation must take account
of the variables affecting this communicative success.106
Resources, rights and representation There are potential downstream consequences
of involving certain groups, such as the risk of government capture.107 Jean Tirole’s
“revolving door” between government and the main interest group, enabling govern-
ment capture,108 is relevant for small “action arenas” such as New Zealand fisheries
management.109 Participation activity is often determined by interest groups’ differ-
ent ”resource mobilisation”110 ability.111 Resource mobilisation (being able to deploy
funding and human resources) is heavily influenced by the type and distribution of
benefits from natural resources. For example, the wide, shallow distribution of the
benefits from public goods contrasts with the highly concentrated distribution of pri-
vate goods, particularly if (as is often the case) there is a private property right enabling
100Sampford (1994)
101Arrow (1951); Downs (1957); Young (1988)
102Arnstein (1969); King and Stivers (1998)
103Mikalsen et al. (2007)
104Fox (1990); Klein (2000)
105Wald (1985); Bobbio (1987); Mulgan (2004)
106Mutter et al. (1999); Furlong and Kerwin (2004); Jamal (2004)
107Golden (1998); Holyoake (2003)
108Tirole (1986)
109Ostrom et al. (1994); Singleton (2000); Yandle (2003)
110Singleton (2000); Yandle (2003)
111McCarthy and Zald (1977); Spiller (1990); Baumgartner and Leech (2001)
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easy transformation of the fruit of a natural resource into money.112
The “silent constituency” (or “missing market”) status of future generations113 is
a difficult issue for vox populi approaches to directing government agents’ decision-
making. The concept has been extended to non-human species,114 asking for example
how non-human species’ existence rights (inherent value) and option value for fu-
ture generations should be accounted for. The sustainability literature provides insight
via the notion of capital (natural, human and manufactured), and the substitutability
(and non-substitutability) of the elements in the capital portfolio that each generation
receives from its antecedents and passes to its descendants.115 (Lags in the manifes-
tation of environmental externalities are another dimension of challenge.116) However
modern government structures make little formal provision for such intergenerational
decision-making, leaving government agents to use their discretion to balance missing
markets’ anticipated needs against those of the more clamorous present generation.
The philosopher king
Plato’s “philosopher king” (the benevolent, omniscient autocrat117) provides the label
for this information source for “what is best” to do for government problems such as
how to manage fisheries. Taking this approach, a leader essentially claims that he or
she “knows best” what to do — better than the wider public — and, thus directed, the
outcomes of government will therefore be better than if the citizens were to direct them.
A variant on the philosopher king notion is the benevolent “king” drawing omniscience
from expert advice, an arrangement that Svein Jentoft (adding to Weber’s three types
of authority for rulers118) calls “the authority of expertise”.119 Here, the “king” is
a sort of colonial organism whose “brain” includes expert advisors and knows better
than the citizenry “what is best” because it has uniquely good information supplied by
experts.
Intense debate continues over the idea that governments, by their very nature, de-
fine “what is best” less myopically and in a more public-spirited way than individuals,
resulting in policy that is better for the nation than that which citizens would call for.
Saving us from ourselves? Regardless of the shortcomings of bureaucrats, the com-
plexity and “public good” characteristics of many shared natural resources make it
112Landell-Mills (2002); Mansfield (2004); Goble (2006)
113Broome (1994); Bhat and Stamatiades (2003)
114Dobson (1996); Saward (2006)
115D’Amato et al. (1990); Taylor (1998); Kysar (2007)
116Carpenter and Gunderson (2001)
117Sprague (1962)
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unlikely that anything even approaching a socially-optimal distribution of them will
be achieved by people acting in isolation, pursuing individual desires on the basis of
their own information.120 Human individuals’ observed tendencies to temporal my-
opia,121 susceptibility to issue framing effects122 and media manipulation,123 and in-
ability to objectively judge risk 124 are the reason for the “paradox” of environmental
democracy.125 It is difficult indeed to find expression of Rousseau’s volonte´ ge´ne´rale,
a “general will” that is immune to these handicaps and taps into the true greater good.
If natural resource managers seek increased public participation and the benefits of
“communicative rationality”126 this seems to militate for increased effort in science
communication. Until such time as the benefits of this manifest itself in a public more
attuned to a volonte´ ge´ne´rale, there is a clear natural resource management role for
government: preventing “wasteful exploitation of Nature’s resources”127 and “saving
people from themselves”.128
To a point, advice from experts can inform government agents about biological
and ecological complexity, thereby making decisions better-informed and arguably
improving the content of decisions – imparting the “authority of expertise”. But a fun-
damental and omnipresent question remains: does being part of an institution called
government somehow better enable an individual human being to compare the incom-
mensurable, know the social discount rate129 and otherwise transcend the inherently
human limitations listed above?
4.3.3 What government agents do, day-to-day
Where “what is best” can be defined in several mutually exclusive ways, how should
government make tradeoffs? This is often the case in marginal decisions, such as
where fishing unavoidably depletes a rare bycatch species or where the target stock
may be at a critical minimum threshold.
In practice, governments make use of both the vox populi and philosopher king
methods to define the goals for policy to manage natural resources. To maximise both
the substantive quality of policy decisions and their perceived mandate, policy-makers
combine tools such as stakeholder consultation with advice from specialist experts.
Meanwhile, the exigencies of the political and budgetary processes often exert con-
120Ostrom (1986); de Jasay (1989); Langbein and Kerwin (2000)
121Goodin (1982)
122Tversky and Kahneman (1981); Levin et al. (2002)
123Roll-Hansen (1994); Winterton (2003); Younger et al. (2005)
124Yudkowsky (2008)
125Doherty and de Geus (1996); Mason (1999)
126Habermas (1987)
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129Eckstein (1961); Marglin (1963); Bradford (1975); Williams (1978)
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trary influences on this activity. The policy process has been heavily studied, with the
literature moving from simpler models of decision-making130 through to more sophis-
ticated models of the complex decision-making processes.131 However this wealth of
literature allows insight into how governments make policy, but do not shed much light
on how to tackle fundamental, substantive demand-for-government problems such as
oceanic fisheries management.
International law principles
In recent decades the precautionary principle has appeared as a more substantive guide
for the outcomes of natural resource management policy, though its varied manifesta-
tions in domestic and international law hinder practical interpretations.132 Sustainable
management is another guiding principle, whose future element suggests avoiding ir-
reversibility in natural resource management policy,133 but it is open to interpretation
on the issue of substitutability of capital.134 Both these principles are common features
in modern natural resource management law and policy, including the New Zealand
Fisheries Act, but provide limited assistance government agents making on-the-ground
marginal decisions. Government agents know well that in situations of conflict, duty
to their employer institution — the government of the day as a representative of the
public — precludes their personal norms from driving their professional behaviour.
However where there is little information on what their government actually means by
requiring precautionary decision-making, where can one turn for guidance?
Legacy systems often limit the option sets of contemporary governments, partic-
ularly given the need to avoid antagonising voters. Governments inherit established
resource-distributing structures, such as property rights in fisheries, which have be-
come cemented in social, economic and political structures along with their attendant
effects on power distributions.135 They also inherit the ecological legacy of historical
resource management, which for New Zealand fisheries includes a set of deep-water
stocks that have been heavily fished-down but are still poorly-understood. Many deci-
sions are therefore potentially marginal ones, with consequent distributive effects that
raise the ecological, economic, social and sometimes political stakes. These are key
characteristics of “wicked problems”136 which modern risk society is creating more of
130Downs (see for example 1957); March and Simon (see for example 1958); Lindblom (see for example
1959); Stigler (see for example 1971); Buchanan (see for example 1980)
131Stone (1989); Sabatier (1988); Rochefort and Cobb (1993); Kingdon (1984); Ostrom (1986); Wil-
davsky (1987)
132Cameron and Abouchar (1991); VanderZwaag (2002)
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than at any other time in human history.137
The demand-for-government problem of fisheries management, especially in the
highly complex and poorly-understood deep-water context, means government agents
receive limited information about “what is best” to do from both the vox populi and
philosopher king sources. Science can seem to be an oasis of objectivity and solidity
in the shifting sands of risk society policy-making. However, the quality-assurance
of scientific best practice is still our best tool for ensuring we have the most accurate
possible picture of objective phenomena. Incautious leaps by science into the policy
domain— and decision-makers incautiously dragging scientists into the policy domain
— have the potential to jeopardise the operation of this valuable tool.
4.3.4 New ways of doing things
Cognisant of this risk, there are increasing arguments that the unique conditions of the
modern world demand new types of science138 and wholly new approaches to policy-
making. As a starting point, these approaches have awareness of the gaps in society’s
understanding and the limitations of the tools at our disposal for filling them. They de-
liberately combine scientific and non-scientific disciplines in awareness of risk and un-
certainty and the need for holism when predicting consequences of policy choices.139
Such approaches would help “re-embed” economic activity in society, reconnecting
humans’ actions to their consequences – particularly their impacts on nature.140 No-
tions such as Lubchenco’s (1998) “new social contract for science” demanding greater
policy involvement by scientists,141 are useful to help identify the terms of this more
intimate engagement. Such a formalised approach is a critical step to allow integration
of science into policy while protecting its ability to provide its unique contribution.
4.4 Summary of Conceptual Threads
4.4.1 The context of fisheries science
Objectivity is the link between the practice of scientific research, and the authority
of science rests on its objectivity as a scout or messenger, going forth into unknown
areas and reporting back to the rest of society on what is out there. This objectivity in
turn rests on the checks that the scientific method has built into itself over centuries,
which seek to remove human subjectivity from the analysis so that a plain, unfiltered,
untainted picture of the subject phenomenon is presented.
137Wright (2004)
138Funtowicz and Ravets (1993); Lee (1993); Wagner (2001); Barry (2005)
139King (1994); Jentoft (2000); Hughes et al. (2005); Mayumi and Giampietro (2006)
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The disinterestedness (objectivity) of the individual scientist as a professional,
achieved and assessed through the scientific method, is a (if not the) crucial component
of this link. The philosophy of science and the arguments seen during Science Wars
continue to deconstruct and dispute, from a variety of angles, the nature and validity of
the link between scientific method and “the truth” about the world. The impossibility
of entirely removing subjectivity and influences of individual scientists’ non-scientific
views is widely acknowledged.
However the natural sciences are still able to argue that they are the best means
humanity has for getting accurate descriptions of the world’s objective phenomena.
Decision-makers in fisheries management (and those subject to the decisions) accept
the authority imparted by science. In other words, management decisions that can
show they have used good science are more legitimate than those that cannot.
Scientific objectivity: a difficult climate
Natural science is the best tool we have for getting “the truth” about fisheries, hu-
man beings make the decisions that produce scientific advice about the status of New
Zealand’s marine species. Scientific experts are a key part of this, for they are trained
to be better than laypeople at excluding subjectivity from their thinking. However,
the New Zealand fisheries management context makes it difficult to be a pure sci-
entist. Many generic natural resource management issues and deep-water-fisheries-
management issues are constantly pushing their way into the scientific decision-making
process. Some have already shaped the fisheries management landscape to the extent
where they affect the components of decision-making fora before meetings even begin.
High uncertainty in deep-water fisheries research means that fisheries scientists’
decisions in the science meeting rounds can have a significant non-scientific com-
ponent which threatens their objectivity.142 This uncertainty, plus the complexity of
deep-water fisheries and the scarcity of information on the wider public’s value in
deep-water biota, means scientific decisions have an unintendedly large influence on
deep-water fisheries policy. These lack mandate because they are being effected by
scientists rather than those charged with policy-making, and are likely to be made
poorly because scientists are professionally ill-equipped to weigh non-scientific con-
siderations.
Operating strictly and solely in the scientific-technical mode in RPG, FAWG and
RCC meetings is therefore difficult. However they are key to the process designed
to provide the objective information on New Zealand’s deep-water biota so critical
to fisheries management, and the scientific process is “the only game in town” for
acquiring that information.
142Clark (2003)
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How the Conceptual Framework will be used
There are certain issues that are perpetually omnipresent in fisheries management, of
which some are thrown into sharper relief by the unique conditions of New Zealand
deep-water fisheries management. These are all non-scientific considerations, which
clamour at the metaphorical gates of the scientific decision-making process. The
“guards” at these gates are the motivations that push scientists to restrict their analytical
decisions and behaviour to scientific and technical considerations only, in accordance
with the norms common to the scientific community and with the acknowledged role
of the scientific fora. The conceptual framework will be used as a taxonomy of infil-
trating forces and the scientific defenders, functioning as a spotter’s guide to inform
interpretation of interview data.
The infiltrating forces are a combination of “big picture” notions about how fish-
eries management should be done (“what is best” for the public, what is fairest, what
is most efficient), and more personal responses to perceptions of other people’s be-
haviour. If interview data and analysis shows that these are present in scientific meet-
ings despite the procedural mandate that specifically excludes them, it can be presumed
that they may be having an impact on the objectivity of the meetings’ analysis. Once
a non-scientific issue appears to be regularly present on the decision-making stage in
scientific fora, the thesis will attempt to ascertain whether it is having an effect on the
objectivity of scientific advice, and if so what that effect is.
Qualifier This research freely acknowledges the difficulty of identifying what drives
a person’s actions. Not being present in deep-water science meetings, nor having any
quantifiable record of the rationales for decisions, means relying on meeting attendees’
subjective assessments of other meeting attendees’ behaviour and what drives them,
and then making a further subjective assessment (though this latter is more signposted).
Likely candidates for threatening scientific objectivity
The nature of complex public goods (marine environments) versus private goods (cap-
tured and sold fish) affects how easily value in these can be communicated and ex-
pressed as the vox populi. The distribution of fisheries rents (from the operation of
private property rights) has an impact on significant influence on the scientific “fire-
power” representing different interest groups. (This is an example of a non-scientific
issue that affects scientific meetings before they even begin.) The depleted, slow-
growing nature of many deep-water stocks and the scarcity of information raise the
spectre of at least local extinctions as a potential consequence of fishing activity. This
would have major consequences for future generations, for the public good and for op-
tion value, and for distributive equity. The issue of the interplay between efficiency and
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effectiveness in science (particularly science for policy), highlighted by questions of
funding, makes regular appearances due to shortages of funding for research into tar-
get and bycatch stocks, and the monopoly provider market for independent deep-water
scientific research.
What could guide next steps?
The literature analysing how science is operating in modern societies, which need
policy decisions made for wicked problems, provides clues to how New Zealand might
proceed in deep-water fisheries management given the issues with the status quo. This
will inform the conclusions and recommendations section of the thesis.
The following chapter presents the results of interviews, where key people involved
in deep-water fisheries science and management were interviewed to elicit information
on what goes on in the yearly scientific fora.
Chapter 5
Results
5.1 Introduction
This section presents the results of interviews that sought to provide insight on the
decision-making process in these meetings. They focus on whether and how the par-
ticipants ensure that the scientific and technical analysis (that is the meetings’ entire
raison d’eˆtre) is insulated from the non-scientific issues that loom large in the wider
fisheries management landscape. This would provide reassurance that the scientific
analysis from these meetings is objective as possible, and gives the most accurate pic-
ture of the state of deep-sea resources that New Zealand can afford.
This section first maps this landscape with reference to the scientific advice pro-
cess, identifying the features of NZ fisheries management that “clamour at the gate”
of the scientific fora. It will then look at how scientific analysis operates in this envi-
ronment, with a view to assessing whether a lay observer can be reassured as above.
Material from interviews will be cited according to how participants indicated on
consent and waiver of confidentiality forms their material could be attributed (see Ap-
pendix C). Further details of interviews may be found in Appendix B. Brief summaries
of interviewees’ involvement with fisheries management in New Zealand, as described
to the author, can be found in Appendix D.
5.2 Government Fisheries Management Role
5.2.1 Philosopher kings or voices of the People?
While there was general agreement that MFish must manage New Zealand’s fisheries
resources in the public interest, the actual form of that interest was hotly contested.
Interviewees felt in general that there has been no large-scale, comprehensive research
into the wider New Zealand public’s macro-level wishes for fisheries and marine man-
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agement that could set an overall direction for the government. Initiatives such as
public consultation for the Oceans Policy were acknowledged to be the right type of
remedy for this problem, but had not gone far enough to significantly improve on the
status quo.
Satisficing but losing scientific accuracy?
Complaints about fisheries policy mis-firing on scientific issues occurred relatively
frequently throughout interviews, which is perhaps not surprising given the scientist-
heavy interview sample. A wide range of interviewees felt that policy-makers seem to
understand neither science nor the practice of fishing (Carey, Clement, Courtney, IP,
McKoy, Sullivan, Weeber). An industry interviewee opined that MFish policy staffers
are trying to correct for deficiency of fisheries policy, but are generating large quantities
of inferior-quality material (Starr).
Several participants (NIWA, industry and ENGO) felt that a general deficiency of
communication between MFish policy and science staff causes the perceived scientific
inadequacy of much Ministry policy, or at least allows it to persist (McKoy, Starr,
Stokes, Weeber). While observing that it is scientists’ responsibility to ensure that
their results are communicated intelligibly to non-experts, an industry respondent saw
an unusual degree of scientific illiteracy in MFish’s policy department, particularly
compared to European equivalents (Stokes).
One industry participant attributed policymakers’ science failures to a tendency
to simply ignore the results of research (Courtney), while others (from the industry,
NIWA, and MFish) believed scientific shortcomings in policy are due to policymakers’
failure to participate in scientific processes or engage sufficiently with the scientific
community (Courtney, McKoy, Sullivan). The ENGO interviewee noted that there
is variation in different policymakers’ level of engagement with science processes,
observing that the deep-water group is one forum where policy staff make an effort to
participate (Weeber).
Policy vacuum: contested resource allocation decisions
Interviewees argued that MFish is chronically late delivering on promises to create
policy, and when policy eventuates it is too superficial. One participant cited the
SMEEF as an example which took five years “. . . and you could’ve done it in three
months if that was all it was going to be” (Weeber). An industry respondent and
the ENGO respondent both cited fisheries standards as another example, expressing
cynicism about fisheries standards’ potential while they remained without legislative
incorporation (Clement, Weeber).
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Research participants made particular mention of the fact that it is not the ITQ itself
(which is legislatively articulated in great detail) but rather the deficiency or absence of
legal and policy context for the property right that is causing problems (IP, Participant,
Stokes, Weeber). An underlying question, rooted in the dual “philosopher king / vox
populi” role of government, is whether it is desirable to ask the New Zealand public
what it wants or if clear, comprehensive, macro-scale management directions can be
set by MFish without the significant expense of this exercise. (More detail can be
found in “Providing for in situ value” below.)
Several participants (MFish, industry and ENGO) stated that large-scale public
debate over the overall direction for New Zealand’s fisheries management is urgently
needed to be able to set major fisheries management objectives (Crothers, IP, Stokes,
Weeber). The absence of such a vision leaves day-to-day fisheries management more
open to conflict, especially decisions allocating fisheries resources between extractive
and non-extractive uses. One industry-affiliated interviewee stated that industry stake-
holders swiftly contest allocative decisions because they see them as being made in a
policy vacuum, and resent what they see as arbitrary imposition of one set of values
and priorities upon another (Harte).
An absence of information on New Zealanders’ fundamental values in fisheries
means different fisheries stakeholders can attack management decisions that disadvan-
tage them on the basis that they represent the interests of New Zealand’s “silent major-
ity”, or the wider public. For example, industry-affiliated and former Ministry intervie-
wees felt that if forced to choose between environmental preservation and maintenance
of current living standards (supported by economic contributions from the fishing in-
dustry), most New Zealanders would opt for the latter (Clement, Major). In contrast,
an industry-affiliated participant and a former Ministry respondent argued that the fish-
ing industry’s incentives fundamentally diverge from wider social objectives, and the
government should manage New Zealand’s fisheries because they can properly repre-
sent the greater public interest (Harte, Cornelius).
Policy vacuum II: practical management moves ahead
Interviewees noted that absent or insufficient fisheries policy leaves day-to-day man-
agement (including fisheries science) to move ahead of it. Industry-affiliated, former
and current MFish interviewees cited cost recovery as an example, noting that despite
its important distributional ramifications, it was simply adopted without any public dis-
cussion as a replacement source for the $30 million the disestablished resource rentals
had provided (Allen, Annala, Sullivan).
The role of the Act’s section 10 (requiring caution and consideration of uncertainty
in fisheries management), and particularly 10(d) (stipulating that insufficient informa-
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tion cannot justify failure to act in pursuit of the Fisheries Act’s purpose) was an in-
teresting element in interviews. When asked directly, most participants stated that the
advent of section 10 had not had a significant impact on how information is handled in
fisheries management. However, a prominent feature of interviews was the issue with
section 10(d) — its failure to stipulate whether to err in favour of the utilisation or the
sustainability elements of the Act’s purpose when making decisions under uncertainty,
allowing it to be interpreted in mutually exclusive ways. Interviewees who perceived
a policy-maker consistently erring in favour of one purpose or the other saw this as
evidence of “capture” by interest groups. Interview respondents who saw participants
in scientific meetings consistently erring towards sustainability or towards utilisation
interpreted this as inappropriate policy-making behaviour.
Interestingly, there was little direct mention of the influence of RPGs’ decisions
in setting the distribution of research effort and thereby the distribution of scientific
information — and uncertainty — between stocks. One exception was the former
Ministry respondent who emphasised the importance of keeping an eye on the bigger
picture, because decisions (in RPGs) over which questions to address with research
and which to put in the “too hard basket” have far-reaching implications (Cornelius).
5.3 Management for All New Zealanders?
Fisheries management policy is relevant for people operating in a strictly scientific,
technological environment because it can guide technical decision-making where sci-
entific uncertainty is high.
5.3.1 Provision for in situ value: policy guiding science
Discussion of providing for in situ value in marine resources such as intrinsic and
option value showcased this phenomenon. It was particularly evident in the issue of
whether such value justifies restricting fishing beyond the level needed to minimise
the risk of inducing critical depensation1 in a target stock. This is uniquely starkly
illustrated in deep-water fisheries contexts, where there is a strong dichotomy between
stakeholder groups.
Is in situ value worth the bother?
Three participants (former Ministry, industry and unaffiliated) felt that practically pro-
viding for in situ value in fisheries management was a Herculean task but one nonethe-
less worthy of attention (Annala, IP, Participant). Others (former MFish, science
1Critical depensation is where a population is so small that under natural conditions (with normal
background levels of predation, sickness, emigration and so on) it cannot maintain its size by reproduction
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provider-affiliated and two industry-affiliated) felt that attempting to provide practi-
cally for the exercise of non-extractive value would open a Pandora’s Box. Therefore
if provision for in situ value is to be embarked upon, it must be strictly controlled
(Allen, Clement, Hilborn, Stokes).
Discussing the use of area closures as a marine resource management tool, two
participants (NIWA and MFish) felt that the public interest in avoiding losses of deep-
water coral and sponge species merits implementing zero-fishing areas (McKoy, Sul-
livan). Two industry-affiliated participants questioned the rationality of closing large
areas of the EEZ “just ’cause” and noted that the public would never see (and by im-
plication not value) deep-water species if they were not fished (Harte, Starr). Three
interviewees (former Ministry and industry) posited that the public interest in non-
extractive value can probably be fulfilled by preserving a minimal quantum of biota
(Allen, Hilborn, Stokes). Several industry participants nevertheless highly praised
the fishing industry’s sustainability initiatives such as the BPA proposal (Courtney,
Clement, Harte, Hilborn, Starr). The ENGO respondent felt that BPAs without scien-
tific support as being ecologically representative are not useful (Weeber).
On the issue of quota cuts to preserve non-target species, two industry-affiliated
participants argued that the greater public does not understand the notion of fish-down
to BMSY, nor why it is not necessarily better to manage at higher standing stocks
(Hilborn, Starr). One questioned the rationality of economically painful quota cuts
whose only benefit would be slightly more security and a slightly higher standing
stock (Hilborn).
Interestingly, there was unexpected accord between a Ministry respondent’s and
an industry-affiliated respondent’s discussions of protecting bycatch species. Their
statements suggested that they had respectively interpreted section 10’s “precaution”
as meaning protection for deep-water benthic biota (Sullivan), and for vulnerable,
“unique” marine environments (Harte). They felt that when these phenomena are iden-
tified, there is no point in further research, for in most cases protection is automatically
required. Some industry-affiliated interviewees argued that in being made to constrain
its resource use to rehabilitate already-modified productive terrain, the fishing industry
is being singled out from New Zealand’s primary industries, particularly when com-
pared with the environmentally destructive dairy industry (Clement, Stokes).
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5.4 The Context For Fisheries Science: Potential Vehicles
For Threats To Objectivity
5.4.1 Money and Efficiency — research and funding
Efficiency and financial risk in research provision
Several industry-affiliated and science provider respondents felt that MFish’s research
procurement process is run by scientists for scientists, and combined with an “open
chequebook” attitude, this results in MFish condoning exorbitant charging by NIWA
(Clement, Hilborn, Starr, Stokes). An industry participant cited an example of NIWA
quoting the Ministry around 50% more than it quoted an industry group for the same
job (Clement), while an SP participant described it as very competitive, where it actu-
ally has competition (Hampton).
For a variety of other respondents, a long-standing market failure — the monopoly
for independent deep-water research provision — is the dominant feature of New
Zealand’s deep-water science landscape (Crothers, Hilborn, IP, Participant, Sullivan),
and NIWA’s commercial imperative determines its pricing behaviour (Clement, Hamp-
ton). MFish, NIWA and unaffiliated interviewees argued that the contestable contract
approach to government fisheries research introduces significant transaction costs. For
deep-water research these are largely formalities, yielding dead-weight losses rather
than the benefits of genuine competition (Crothers, McKoy, Participant, Robertson,
Sullivan).
Responses varied over what should be done about this situation. Some industry-
affiliated interviewees argued strongly that devolving deep-water research procure-
ment to industry (or at least contracting industry boats to perform stock assessments)
would be much more efficient and effective than the status quo (Carey, Clement, Court-
ney). For other respondents, the competitive system’s market failure in deep-water re-
search is an unfortunate fact of life, and some inefficiencies must be borne for the sake
of maintaining a flow of independent, high-quality research to use in management
(Crothers, Sullivan). Ministry, former Ministry and unaffiliated respondents readily
acknowledged the inefficiencies of the status quo but emphasised the need for the gov-
ernment’s research to be seen to be independent. The “fox in the henhouse” presump-
tion means the burden of proof rests with industry to prove their fisheries research is
comparable with the heavily peer-reviewedMFish research before significant moves to
using industry-collected science will be made (Allen, Annala, Crothers, Participant).
NIWA, unaffiliated and industry participants cited examples of skippers unwill-
ingness or inability to collect worthwhile series of good-quality data (SF, McKoy, Par-
ticipant, Robertson). One Ministry respondent’s experience was that despite the best
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intentions and all the promises in the world, industry “get bored and uninterested and
their programmes never happen, or run for a year and then fall over — they’re not even
bothering”(Sullivan).
Funding, science and uncertainty, and the best science?
Participants’ comments about efficiency and waste in research provision revealed dif-
fering views of the nature of science.
NIWA, Ministry, unaffiliated and former-Ministry-affiliated interviewees felt that
the fundamental unpredictability of scientific research (which is even greater for deep
water science) means that a certain amount of “wasted” effort and funding (that fails
to yield a useful result) is unavoidable. However this does not render that piece of
research unworthy of funding nor necessarily inappropriate for cost-recovery (Annala,
Cornelius, Participant).
This contrasted sharply with an industry participant’s view (see below):
You would go to the science service providers and say “Can you please
provide me with an answer to this question?” and you wouldn’t accept
“Well maybe if you give me a research contract I could“, you’d say . . . ”I’ll
have a commercial contract, I’ll contract you to answer this question. If
you don’t give me an answer I can use, then you don’t get paid” . . . . It’s no
good me going to someone and buying a boat to go fishing and they won’t
guarantee it floats! [. . . ] Put the risk on the service provider not on the
Crown! “but nobody would bid for the work!” Well can’t you see who’s
taking the risk? We’re buying something that even the people providing it
aren’t prepared to take the risk. (Clement)
Two industry-affiliated participants argued that NIWA’s status as an effective monopoly
provider in deep-water science had materially affected the quality of its analysis. They
perceived a degree of complacency in NIWA scientists’ work (Starr) which made in-
dustry scientists’ second opinion on research results all the more important (Clement).
The role of industry scientists as a “watchdog” over MFish and NIWA science was
clear, as was the notion of industry scientists’ own science being particularly con-
scientious to rebut the “fox in the henhouse” presumption (both discussed below).
Several participants remarked that becoming a CRI seemed to make NIWA scientists
feel obliged to present a united front, reducing their willingness to engage in robust
scientific debate (Major, Harte, Hilborn, Allen) and reducing willingness to engage in
collaborative research (Hampton).
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Overall fisheries management efficiency
Interviewees’ discussions of cost recovery’s effect on fisheries science were largely
negative, with the exception of a handful of statements. Three interviewees saw benefit
in the way cost recovery causes the wider industry to discuss the merits of fisheries
research and understand the back-stage costs of fisheries management (Major, Starr,
Stokes), and of the discipline it imposes on government spending (Clement). There
was also conditional support for the cost-recovery notion provided government-funded
research and innovation were sufficiently funded (Harte, Sullivan).
The project-by-project, stock-by-stock approach to cost recovery and its transac-
tion costs engendered widespread frustration amongst interviewees, who used lan-
guage such as “bloody stupid”, “ridiculous” and “goddamned” to describe it. One
interviewee expressed frustration with the amount of MFish staffers’ time that cost re-
covery transactions take up (Participant). Two respondents expressed sympathy with
fishers’ resistance to paying for research that did not benefit them (McKoy, IP), and
as one stated: “the whole [quota management] system’s oriented around quotas for
particular species and stocks” (McKoy).
Several interviewees noted that cost recovery creates a perverse incentive, whereby
the fishing industry advocates against research on the basis of its expense or commer-
cial consequences rather than on its merits for overall fisheries management (Allen,
Crothers, Hilborn, IP, McKoy, Participant, Starr, Stokes, Weeber). Most non-target
species research is not commercially valuable and may in fact be commercially detri-
mental if it leads to catch limit reductions. Two industry participants were pragmatic
about the industry being cost-recovered for research into charismatic and rare bycatch
species such as Maui’s dolphins, resigned to the fact that there is strong public pressure
to manage such species conservatively (Carey, Courtney).
Several interviewees argued that stock-by-stock cost recovery also fails when fish
stocks are depleted, because the industry can least afford to pay for it. As noted,
this is in fact when stock assessments and other research are most needed as manage-
ment must be particularly precise. This system essentially deadlocks non-fished stocks
(non-target species and closed fisheries): because no revenue is coming out of them,
no research can be funded to assess reopening the fishery (Allen, Hampton, Hilborn,
McKoy, Participant, Sullivan, Robertson, Weeber).
Squeezing fisheries research purchasing into the financial year was seen to crip-
ple New Zealand’s long-term research ability. Research is usually confined to short
projects, and long-term studies are extremely difficult to arrange, causing a deficiency
of good long-term information on New Zealand’s marine resources (Hampton, McKoy,
Participant, Starr, Weeber). One industry participant commented that one of SeaFIC’s
roles is to convince the industry to pay for important research (IP), with which it has
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some success. However major one-off research projects, which may occur only every
five or six years, are unattractive prospects for industry funding as the benefits accrue
over a long period of time (and are often not guaranteed), and bank loans would be
required to fund such projects up-front (Sullivan, Weeber).
Better alternatives? Public funding
An industry-affiliated interviewee felt that these problems are a reason for greater flows
of government funding (Harte), whereas unaffiliated, ENGO, NIWA and SP respon-
dents saw them as arguments for a more broad-brush cost recovery system more akin
to a resource rental (Hilborn, McKoy, Participant, Weeber).
The “attributable cost” principle for cost recovery “totally ignores the public in-
terest in having fisheries . . . and the general public interest in sustainability and biodi-
versity and having it there” (McKoy). Three interviewees similarly argued that gov-
ernment funding for the QMS should reflect the long-term value that a well-managed
fishery posed to New Zealand (Carey, Courtney, Stokes). Several industry respondents
stated that research into the biology of non-target species, and research to ascertain
whether fishing is having an adverse impact on the environment, should be funded by
the government and not cost-recovered. Once an adverse impact has been identified,
research to investigate and mitigate it can fairly be charged to the industry (Clement,
IP, SF, Stokes).
An unaffiliated interviewee and the ENGO respondent observed that MFish’s 2006-
2007 fisheries research budget was 57% of its 1991-1992 level, a shortfall of around
$10 million accounting for inflation (Participant, Weeber). New Zealand’s science
funding in general (and fisheries in particular) was described as paltry by international
standards (Harte, Stokes), and one argued that the QMS is so data-hungry that even to
manage target stocks with precision (let alone bycatch species or the marine environ-
ment) simply cannot be done without subsidies (Stokes).
Industry, NIWA, unaffiliated and SP interviewees observed that the number of
species in the QMS has tripled since 1991-1992, and the addition of a suite of far-
reaching environmental principles to the Fisheries Act has imposed a considerable
additional research burden (Allen, Hilborn, IP, Major, McKoy, Participant, Stokes,
Weeber). ENGO and industry-affiliated participants argued that the largely policy-
less, “clip-on” (Weeber) nature of the Act’s environmental principles means that im-
plementing them demands a huge amount of scientific research. As this straddles
the boundary between “public good” and “internalising externality” science, it falls
into a funding “black hole” between cost-recovery and government resourcing (Harte,
Stokes, Weeber).
Two Ministry participants hinted at a paradigm shift in fisheries science, feeling
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that New Zealand must admit that “OK, we’re not going to research our way out
of diminishing stocks” (Sullivan), and must instead manage our way out: “perhaps
mov[ing] from a reasonable risk, high information, high cost approach to managing
. . . to a very low risk, low information approach” (Crothers).
Summary While it is clear that the context in which deep-water science fora operate
is perpetually controversial, this is not necessarily cause for concern. Marine fisheries
management is an inherently complicated and difficult process, requiring science to
feed into policy that is inevitably politically charged. The question is whether the
decision-making processes of New Zealand fisheries science can be relied upon to
deliver the best — i.e. the most accurate — statements about deep-water stocks so that
the QMS can function properly and marine resources be utilised sustainably.
The role of the science fora is to provide statements of the status of deep-water
marine resources that are as accurate as possible. The proxy assessment of accuracy
being used is objectivity of the analytical and decision-making processes. If therefore
it appears that the objectivity of scientific analysis in scientific meeting rounds is being
shielded against the various subjective forces of the political, economic and social
context, we can be relatively satisfied that the scientific process is doing its job.
5.5 What Happens in Science Fora: How Scientists Act in
Practice
In order to understand how MFish and non-MFish scientists manage the interplay be-
tween “objective” science and “subjective” policy at a practical level in the yearly
science fora, interviewees were asked about the roles and risk management behaviour
of different participants in FAWGs, RPGs and RCCs. Questions were aimed at elicit-
ing information on how the participants in these fora ensure the meetings’ outcomes
— scientific advice to the Minister — are risk-neutral or objective, and scientifically
robust.
5.5.1 Scientists in action: scientific purity, human frailty, both?
Several respondents shared the view that because FAWGs, RPGs and RCCs are strictly
scientific and technical fora, participants should conduct themselves as pure scientists.
The successful functioning of a scientific forum is therefore measurable by how closely
its participants’ behaviour matches expectations of scientific comportment. For inter-
viewees whose views fell into the “pure science” category, it is simply not appropriate
to consider equal representation of all fisheries stakeholder positions in RPGs, RCCs
and FAWGs because these are scientific and technical fora. If scientists are acting
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as “pure” scientists, the positions they take on a particular technical issue should be
independent of their normative ideas about fisheries management.
While this is a pure Mertonian view of scientists, this position was argued as one
which should guide scientists’ behaviour in RPGs, FAWGs and RCCs. Sitting along-
side these was a distinct but related issue of the degree to which MFish scientists, by
virtue of their status as government scientists, had a special and unique role in meet-
ings.
Pure science in action
Participants were unanimous in generally praising the pure scientific performance of
FAWGs as fora for robust and vigorous scientific debate. Industry, NIWA and Ministry
respondents particularly approved of FAWGs’ strictly scientific and technical tenor,
which they felt facilitates discourse largely independent of participants’ affiliations
(Annala, Harte, McKoy, Sullivan). Two NIWA and ENGO respondents hailed the
vigorous scientific debate over alternatives that a large varied gathering of scientists
can achieve (McKoy, Weeber). An industry-affiliated interviewee emphasised that the
scientific scrutiny goes both ways: “I stand up and they rip me to shreds too. [. . . ]
You live by the sword, you die by the sword” (Starr). One former Ministry participant
recalled that industry representatives used to engage in considerable positioning during
consultation rounds, where they would be represented by their lawyers, but MFish had
tried hard — and largely successfully — to remove this (Annala).
An SP and a Ministry interviewee felt that interpersonal forces also operate in
scientific fora to constrain improper behaviour. Long-standing personal relationships
with other FAWG and RPG participants were believed to have this effect, as does the
empathy that present opponents feel from having been “on the other side of the table”
in previous professional lives (Hilborn, Sullivan). Interestingly, one MFish respondent
said that in research fora NIWA scientists “just try to play the field, flatten the plain”,
but also noted that they “. . . do support the Ministry [in its efforts to risk-neutralise
meetings] because they’re ex-Ministry staff” (Sullivan). (This latter observation was
interpreted by some industry scientists as evidence of positioning by NIWA and MFish
scientists (see below).)
There was considerable confidence expressed by current and former Ministry, SP
and industry interviewees that the behavioural and ethical parameters set by scien-
tific norms would be respected, and that the value individual scientists placed in their
professional reputations would restrain them from indulging any desires for advocacy
(Annala, Hilborn, Major, Participant, Stokes, Sullivan).
Several respondents stated that every scientist, without exception, is affected by
values and has some form of proverbial barrow to push (Crothers, Hilborn, Starr). The
66 CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
question is whether scientists can act objectively (as measured by adherence to sci-
entific protocols and reflected in their standing in the scientific community) to ensure
their analysis is shielded from those values.
Commissioned science One respondent recalled that fisheries scientists firmly re-
sisted attempts in the 1990s by the industry to hire scientists “who would help them
in terms of quota” (Stokes). Similarly, a NIWA interviewee stated that NIWA rep-
resentatives’ only advocacy is in defence of their work (McKoy). Industry-affiliated
scientists particularly pointed out that their reputations are all of the highest calibre
and their independence is carefully protected, citing the fact that they regularly tell the
industry things it does not want to hear (Hilborn, Starr, Stokes). Another stated that the
“fox guarding the henhouse” presumption that hangs over industry-affiliated scientists
means that industry-commissioned stock assessments must adhere especially strictly
to the letter of scientific protocols (Harte). For current and former Ministry-affiliated
participants, this means that a burden of proof rests with the industry’s scientists to
prove their mettle as providers of scientifically sound research before MFish would
be willing to devolve responsibility for stock assessments (Allen, Sullivan). (See also
Funding, science and uncertainty: what yields the best science? above.)
For one industry participant, encouraging the industry to accept short-term pain
where appropriate is a major part of SeaFIC’s role; it does not advocate for the indus-
try but rather represents for them, a role akin to a government scientist or policy-maker
freely and frankly advising a senior bureaucrat or minister (Stokes). The ENGO rep-
resentative expressed some surprise at the amount of research that SeaFIC had been
able to persuade the industry to pay for over the years (Weeber). These generally
favourable views of the scientific purity of analysis and behaviour in scientific fora
were articulated despite widespread acknowledgement that significant scientific un-
certainty opens the door to advocacy, and criticism elsewhere in interviews of other
stakeholders’ advocacy behaviour in research fora (see below).
Slightly less pure science in action
Unaffiliated and Ministry respondents said that industry scientists’ contribution to the
scientific pluralism of research fora was valuable if it was “expertise, not advocacy”
and sought to “collaborate rather than capture” research (Crothers, Participant).
Others (industry-affiliated and former Ministry) cited the advantages of another
expert to ’check your sums’, an important role when million-dollar quotas are at stake
(Clement, Hilborn, Major, Starr). Some saw evidence of some monopoly-induced
complacency in NIWA deep-water science that contrasted with industry scientists’ at-
titude (see interviewees’ treatment of efficiency and science in Funding, science and
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uncertainty below.)
Some industry participants felt that this “sum-checking” means acting as a sort of
watchdog over scientific decision-making processes, and reassuring the industry that
the science informing fisheries decision-making is sound and provides the best basis
for management decisions. This, they felt, is a particularly important role for industry
scientists given the Ministry’s and NIWA’s conservatism and the cost-recovered nature
of much of the research (Clement, IP, Stokes). One can presume from these state-
ments that the scientists concerned would first try to ensure that the science was in
fact sound before they reassured the industry about it, a presumption supported by an-
other industry participant’s emphasis of the importance of the “second opinion” role of
industry-commissioned science. Interestingly, the same participant gave no credence
to the notion that positioning occurs in pure scientific fora, saying that “Green science
. . . is about as spurious as Maori science” (Clement).
A Ministry interviewee pointed out much of the confidence in FAWGs’ and RPGs’
scientific and technical objectivity rests on faith. He observed that because there is
no statutory obligation to publicise privately-funded research, in contrast to publicly-
funded research, one cannot be certain if a study cited to support a particular conclu-
sion is from the extreme “tail” of a distribution of many such studies, or represents the
mean. “You’ve got to hope that the honesty is there, that they’ll also show both ends of
the spectrum but you don’t know. You can’t even suspect that they’ve done the added
work [the other studies]” (Sullivan).
5.5.2 Representation of non-scientific views in science fora
A major feature of interviews was the subtle distinction between general (typically
non-expert) representation of the openly values-based positions of interest groups, and
commissioned scientific representation that more or less often aligns with the interests
of that group. It is extremely difficult to define where in practice to draw the line,
and (as noted in the conceptual framework) this is an issue that scientists and the sci-
entific literature have struggled with for decades. This was reflected in interviewees’
responses, which showed the contrasting opinions and degree of confusion on the is-
sue.
Stakeholders’ views - appropriate in science fora?
Participants’ opinions differed on the decision-making level where full stakeholder
representation should be pursued. They touched briefly on the procedural level at
which uncertainty and value-based considerations (the policy or human element) should
be tackled in fisheries management processes. This fed into a range of views of MFish
scientists’ role as government representatives, which are presented below.
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Some interviewees felt that uncertainty in fisheries management was best dealt
with in technical fora, where knowledge was most concentrated, and interest groups
should engage there by hiring scientists to balance the representative field (Harte,
Hilborn, Starr). However two industry-affiliated interviewees and one NIWA-affiliated
respondent argued that since ENGOs’ modus operandi is advocacy (rather than scien-
tific involvement) their participation is best suited to a policy level where, they felt,
value judgements are most appropriately handled (Clement, IP, McKoy).
Observing that hiring expert scientists is beyond the means of most ENGOs, one
interviewee was in favour of assistance to such under-represented groups to help them
surmount general participation barriers in fisheries management decision-making (Wee-
ber). An industry interviewee recognised that ENGOs represent a broader public inter-
est than recreational fishing groups, for example, and could therefore merit government-
independent financial assistance with the expenses of participation in fisheries manage-
ment (IP). However IP also argued that a group’s willingness to pay for a professional
representative is a good indicator of a critical constituency mass (see quote), as shown
by the increasing professionalisation of fisheries management.
“. . . that environmental constituency needs to think about how much it
values the outcomes it could get from actually funding those kind of posi-
tions. The industry pays for people like [us] because they think it’s worth-
while to employ us. And it is. I don’t see why other groups who, if they
truly want to be stakeholders and claim to represent a legitimate interest
in these things which we are talking about, do it on a professional basis!
Brutal!” (IP)
Insufficient scientific representation of other interest groups is not industry scien-
tists’ problem to deal with (IP, Harte, Starr), and does not oblige industry to cease
its own representation. A different industry interviewee felt that it is particularly im-
portant that industry’s views are represented in science decision-making processes be-
cause their support of cost recovery for fisheries research (“users pay”) is conditional
on “users say” (Clement).
A Ministry participant said MFish is aware of the lack of expert scientific repre-
sentation for ENGOs, and in pursuit of the Act’s environmental principles, MFish has
expanded the Science Group and provided a wider perspective on science (Crothers).
The ENGO representative praised the Aquatic Environment Working Group’s scien-
tific view as being generally wider than that FAWGs exhibit, due to the broader range
of scientific institutions that participate in the Aquatic Environment meetings (Wee-
ber). This pluralism led an industry respondent felt this pluralism made that working
group’s analysis “especially woolly” (Clement), suggesting a perceived conflict be-
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tween more complete representation of the scientific opinion distribution and quality
(or at least clarity) of analysis.
One industry-affiliated respondent suggested that greater social embedding of the
fishing industry (such as seen in many Scandinavian countries) would have greater
benefits for fisheries management than attempting to scientifically educate the wider
public so that they can participate in the scientific component of fisheries decision-
making (IP). Two industry-affiliated and one NIWA respondent commented that it is
difficult to identify the “green constituency” or environmental stakeholder that ENGOs
represent (Harte, IP, McKoy).
A feature of interviewees’ discussions was the distinction between representing
a distribution of strictly scientific opinions (scientific pluralism) and representing a
values-based opinion distribution in FAWGs and RPGs. However it was a shifting
frontier, and sometimes disappeared altogether when discussions turned to the day-to-
day reality of participating in scientific meetings.
However, it was possible to discern two themes in interviewees’ views of the ap-
propriateness of values-based (rather than scientific) positioning in science fora. Once
again, whether a respondent took a normative or a positive attitude to scientists’ be-
haviour in meetings significantly influenced their feelings about the role of values-
based representation. Those who took the normative, “pure science” position felt
scientists in meetings should always ignore opportunities to influence wider fisheries
management and refuse to engage in positioning. Those who took the more positive
view argued that advocacy and values-based decision-making were going to happen
anyway, and would likely have an impact on fisheries management because of the
greater influence of scientific advice given the way scientific fora are exercising a
quasi-policy function. Scientists should therefore take the opportunity to have a bene-
ficial influence on deep-water fisheries policy.
Scientific pluralism and advocacy
Positioning for science Two interviewees (science provider and industry-affiliated)
observed that the point of a science contract with an interest group is to supply in-
formation that assists the client with its goals (Hilborn, Starr). The science provider
respondent acknowledged the fact that no interest group will pay for science that does
not support its cause, and the science provider concerned will simply not get a contract
or a contract renewal (Hilborn).
A NIWA and an MFish interviewee argued that such industry “scientist-shopping”
for sympathetic providers undermines scientific disinterestedness (McKoy, Sullivan).
Two Ministry respondents stated that industry scientists actively try to influence the
consensus in FAWGs (Crothers, Sullivan). NIWA and ENGO interviewees described
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industry scientists’ conspicuous silence where tabled research errs in the industry’s
favour, and energetic critique of equally robust or ambiguous research that would dis-
advantage the industry (McKoy, Weeber). They felt that presence of a vested interest
in the science’s outcome nullified the potential benefits that industry scientists’ partic-
ipation could provide through increased scientific pluralism (Crothers, McKoy).
In contrast, other respondents (industry-affiliated and science provider) argued that
industry scientists’ contributions have significantly improved the quality of the scien-
tific analysis in meetings, by redressing imbalance caused by MFish and NIWA posi-
tioning. They gave the introduction of Bayesian analysis to FAWGs and the cessation
of cost-recovered flat area surveys as examples of improvements industry scientists’
participation had made to the scientific advice process, in the face of considerable
Ministry and NIWA resistance (Clement, Hampton). One interviewee felt that NIWA
scientists consistently favour the cautious option when assessing the highly uncertain
results of acoustic sampling, and are extremely suspicious of science suggesting oth-
erwise (Hampton). NIWA scientists’ long resistance to using industry boats for stock
assessments was also given as an example of unreasonable conservatism regarding
research methodology, and two science provider interviewees argued that industry sci-
entists’ efforts had improved the fisheries science provision process by overcoming
this (Hampton, Hilborn).
A NIWA participant felt that NIWA is insufficiently consulted in terms of the plan-
ning process for fisheries science, which he saw as problematic given that it is “. . . the
major source of knowledge about what’s going on in fisheries sciences” (McKoy).
In contrast, several other participants (industry- and SP-affiliated) complained of an
excessively proximal relationship between NIWA and the Ministry science group,
founded on scientists’ status as ex-colleagues, which means amongst other things that
NIWA influences research purchasing decisions and thence science policy (Hampton,
Stokes, Clement, IP, Hilborn, Starr, Carey).
MFish positioning — legitimate?
Strong opinions were evident in interviewees’ discussions of whether MFish scien-
tists’ role as government representatives gives them a unique licence to consider non-
scientific factors in FAWGs and RPGs. Respondents’ views here showed evidence
of two underlying issues. The aforementioned dissension over the appropriateness of
scientists representing stakeholders’ or other value-based positions combined with an
additional layer of disagreement over the role of a government scientist.
This latter conflict was interestingly presented in that all respondents initially artic-
ulated a very “pure science” view of the MFish scientists’ role, linked to similar views
of the role of the scientific meeting process (see “Pure science” above), which would
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theoretically preclude any positioning of the kind that both MFish and non-MFish in-
terviewees later described in their discussions.
Policy is forbidden There was relatively wide agreement across the interview sam-
ple that MFish scientists’ role does not extend to shaping policy. Eight interviewees
stated that Ministry scientists should not engage in policy-making because their role
is to be scientists and as a rule, the normative value-based considerations of policy are
outside scientists’ purview (Allen, Clement, Crothers, Harte, Hilborn, McKoy, Partic-
ipant, Sullivan). One research participant stated categorically that the Science Group
has no input into allocation and other such value-based decisions unless asked to scien-
tifically assess particular management options by the MFish policy group or Ministry
leaders (Participant).
More specifically, several respondents (former and current Ministry, unaffiliated
and industry) stated during interviews that the MFish Science Group’s role is to con-
duct a fair and proper research-generating and research-assessing process, impartially
transmit stakeholders’ views to the Minister, objectively weigh up available research,
and provide free and frank advice on that basis to the Minister (Allen, Crothers, Par-
ticipant, Stokes, Sullivan). In practical terms, there was general consensus that it is
important that RPG, RCC and FAWG meetings are as “clean” — i.e. as scientifically
objective — as possible, and MFish scientists (notably each meeting’s chairperson)
therefore have an arbitrator and referee role. This seemed to mean arbitrating each
meeting’s discussions towards consensus (or at least a large majority), which decision
MFish then receive, take away and transmit as advice to the Minister. Unaffiliated
and Ministry respondents raised the concept of risk-neutrality (where meeting partic-
ipants’ risk tendencies balance out overall) as requisite for achieving consensus (Par-
ticipant, Sullivan). For former and current MFish interviewees, achieving this usually
means being “stuck in the middle”, getting “hammered from all sides”, and occasion-
ally “play[ing] the bad guy” (Annala, Crothers, Sullivan). One participant felt that the
experienced and somewhat battle-hardened nature of Science Group staff means they
are better able to withstand pressure from meeting attendees than less experienced or
younger staff would be (Sullivan).
Not policy-makers, but quasi-policy-makers?
Despite this, however, there was acknowledgement amongst the interview sample that
high uncertainty in scientific research, coupled with the need to keep on managing
fisheries, inevitably pushes management decision-making into a difficult area. The
need for each year’s catch limit decisions to be made requires that someone step into
this area. Interviewees acknowledged that the precautionary approach stipulated in the
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Fisheries Act is designed to guide decision-makers in this zone, but leaves much open
to interpretation. One respondent particularly lamented the vague and unhelpful state
of this legislative directive and the international agreements that inspired it (Partici-
pant). Industry, SP and NIWA interviewees all felt that the absence of a macro-scale
policy framework for fisheries management causes Ministry scientists to engage in
policymaking, particularly under uncertainty (Hilborn, McKoy, Starr, Stokes).
Interviewees differed on whether or not this aroused concern for fisheries man-
agement overall, or for the quality of scientific decision-making. There was a certain
degree of pragmatism expressed by some interviewees (Ministry, former Ministry, in-
dustry and unaffiliated), who felt that while MFish scientists may act ultra vires and
effectively make policy, on the whole they are simply doing their jobs. In general
they enable the science processes to maintain a flow of robust and accurate research
from which appropriate management decisions can be made, in a difficult political,
economic and institutional context (Allen, Crothers, Harte, Participant, Sullivan).
Another respondent felt that New Zealand’s fisheries management would essen-
tially be improved by scientists having greater policy-making influence, while still
others thought there should be considerably less policy influence by MFish scientists
in particular. The ENGO interviewee suggested that New Zealand model its fisheries
management on the CCAMLR2 regime, a science-driven approach to precaution where
scientists have considerable policy-making influence (Weeber). In contrast, industry
participants saw MFish scientists to be essentially writing fisheries policy by being
excessively conservative, a dangerous “philosopher king” tendency that they felt the
proposed changes to the Act’s section 10 would only exacerbate. Two respondents (in-
dustry and science provider) told the interviewer that they are convinced that Ministry
scientists believe orange roughy are irrevocably overfished and would be happy to see
the fisheries closed (Clement, Hilborn).
Policymaking via conservative science One industry respondent felt that Ministry
scientists have a propensity to filter off all but the conservative management options
when formulating advice for the Minister (IP), while another described MFish scien-
tists’ tendency under uncertainty to emphasise the pessimistic interpretations of data
to drive down catch-limit decisions (Stokes). Another described Ministry scientists
taking the conservative option on each one of a model’s variables, in the name of pre-
caution (on that occasion leading, he argued, to a totally inappropriate threshold for
sealion bycatch (Harte)). One SP participant recounted how only after lengthy lobby-
ing by industry-affiliated scientists, the deep-water FAWG “grudgingly” adopted the
working hypothesis whereby CPUE3 declines faster than biomass (Hilborn). On that
2Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
3Catch Per Unit Effort, or the ratio of fish secured to each unit of fishing effort.
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occasion the industry’s and MFish’s different stock assessment calculations arrived at
the vastly different conclusions that the particular orange roughy stock was (respec-
tively) at 40% and at 10% of B0. This event and industry scientists’ arguments have
led to the FAWG adopting a process whereby two parallel stock assessments are con-
ducted, and the average of the two is taken as the final figure. This was seen as a
significant improvement on the status quo, but one for which the industry scientists
had to fight vigorously (Hilborn).
Two industry-affiliated interviewees attributed this conservatism to the fact that
government service inevitably attracts command-and-control personality types (Clement,
IP), while another attributed it to the natural conservatism of scientists in general
(Stokes). Industry-affiliated participants felt that MFish scientists engage in policy-
making because they see themselves as a special case — as “guardians of the fish”
(Stokes), who “. . . have this idea that their bias is a good bias,” despite the fact that
they are not elected representatives (Starr).
In contrast, a NIWA participant felt that MFish scientists, as government scien-
tists, are indeed a special case. He stated that industry make “the ongoing mistake”
of presenting the Ministry as “just another interested party with a particularly conser-
vative view [instead of] representing the public interest” (McKoy). Interestingly, the
quantity of MFish’s consultation with stakeholders — the vox populi element of demo-
cratic responsibility — was never criticised, though the quality, particularly around
cost-recovery, was complained about (see Cost recovery section above). Two intervie-
wees felt that in general termsMFish’s careful and comprehensive consultation process
fulfils the government’s democratic responsibilities for stakeholder consultation (SF,
Participant).
Interviewees’ language gave some clues to their positions on the public interest,
independently of their direct statements about it. Terms such as “using efficiently”,
“productive” and “investment” were notable in industry participants’ discussions of
fisheries and value, (Clement, IP, Stokes), while in MFish interviewees’ responses
language such as “the family silver”, “national assets” and “not their fields [but] our
seamounts” (Crothers, Sullivan) were noteworthy.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Introduction
A clear signal from interviews confirmed the suspicion that had attracted this thesis
to New Zealand deep-water fisheries: they exhibit wicked problem characteristics that
are stronger even than those common to oceanic fisheries, which mean the latter are
an institutional challenge for management. Manufactured risk is strongly evident due
to the heavy fish-down of the 1970s and 1980s. Some orange roughy stocks remain
very vulnerable, and deep-water bycatch (non-target) species such as gorgonian corals
and sponges are likely to be in an equivalent vulnerable position compared to their
shallower-water bycatch counterparts.
Cash-starved marine science
New Zealand’s fisheries science funding has been either static or decreasing in real
terms for several years, while the inherently information-hungry QMS has expanded
over dozens of species. The QMS’ well-articulated property rights rely entirely on
fisheries science to connect them to the animals in the sea. Deep-water stocks are
particularly information-hungry, as the possibility that they are close to critical de-
pensation thresholds, and their ecosystems at risk of associated deleterious effects on
functionality, means they need precise management. Government research funding
falls far short of what is needed, and industry are unlikely to be a source of significant
additional resources.1 Besides government, the only interest groups in the deep-water
arena are the commercial fishing industry and ENGOs. Both groups lay claim to repre-
senting silent majorities of the wider public, and Oceans Policy surveys of the public’s
views on marine resources are too general to provide a clear direction either way.
Sustainability, environmental principles (including a version of ecosystem-based
1The combination of the 10% of port price rule of thumb plus low TACs meaning little value in quota.
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management), information principles and the precautionary principle have been in-
corporated into the Act, signalling recognition of a paradigm shift in fisheries man-
agement. However they lack the clear policy development to direct on-the-ground
decision-making. The precautionary principle (section 10 of the Act) in particular is
notably vague, merely forbidding paralysis under uncertainty rather than stipulating
action in a particular direction.
Distributing uncertainty: research planning and section 10 Research planning
decisions play a significant role in the distribution of uncertainty (which activates sec-
tion 10) by distributing the limited fisheries research funding and thereby distributing
information and uncertainty across species and stocks from year to year. For deep-
water stocks which are very expensive to research, not being researched in a particular
year can mean they are managed under significant uncertainty, opening the door to
conflict in scientific decision-making. (Interestingly, while dedicating considerable
“airtime” to section 10, interviewees made little mention of the role of the RPGs’ de-
cisions.) An attempt at amending the section to direct action towards environmental
protection (following many international articulations of the principle) seems to have
stalled, and the provision remains unchanged.
Keep on satisficing
The existence of a robust property right in fish seems to mean an effective (though
perhaps slowly changing) presumption that the right can continue to be exercised —
that fishing continues until proven otherwise rather than vice-versa. Keeping up with
the demands of information-hungry TAC-setting, along with high transaction costs
from stock-specific cost-recovery, consume significant amounts of MFish time.
“[P]eople that think that writing a piece of paper is going to change peo-
ple’s behaviour are really a little bit silly . . . I just don’t know they’re com-
ing from. I think, yes it would be nice if fisheries management in New
Zealand was organised enough to come up with good fish plans that cov-
ered all the fisheries and they were documented and we did review them
and see what the management objectives were, but without them, the way
we’ve been for the last 30 years, we’re still managing fisheries! There’s a
load of fish out there and we’re still trying to do the job.” (Sullivan)
Interviews confirmed indications in the literature: in deep-water fisheries the cost
recovery regime’s transaction cost burden weighs heavily. Feeling these costs acutely
but failing to see the benefits of the contestable research system, interviewees felt“there’s
got to be a better way”. One potential opportunity cost of this expenditure is structural
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self-examination that could lead to the kind of institutional changes needed for han-
dling the unique characteristics of deep-water fisheries.
In the meantime, while significant scientific uncertainty looks to persist, we must
try to ensure that the existing system does not make any major mistakes with deep-
water fisheries management. It was clear from the research that regardless of how
well the QMS and the fisheries policy framework are managing other New Zealand
fisheries, they are not dealing well with deep-water fisheries.
Is satisficing safe?
The Ministry’s strictly separated process for policy and science advice separates off
scientific decision-making from other advice processes in fisheries management, set-
ting it to generate its advice in glorious isolation and epistemological purity. As almost
all interviewees stated, the job of a scientific-technical forum such as a FAWG is to fo-
cus on the research in front of it, to discuss its strengths and weaknesses, and produce
a statement of what the research says about its subject for the policy process to use.
The decision-making structures established for the scientific advice process work on
the presumption that this will be the way it operates. Because participants will be
adhering to the rules of behaviour (of which a principal one is disinterestedness) set
and enforced over centuries by the scientific community, the fisheries scientific pro-
cess will not need the kind of highly transparent, discursive checks and balances now
increasingly commonplace in policy processes.
The “black box” of the fisheries science advice structure can be argued as an
anachronism. The philosophy of science has urged greater acknowledgement of scien-
tists’ human nature and of the futility of attempting to hermetically seal off scientific
inquiry from subjective influences. Meanwhile, swiftly-developing theories of partic-
ipatory democracy have seen decision-makers pursue the aforementioned discursive
approaches and greater transparency in decision-making. In the Fisheries Act 1996,
this has been manifested in section 12 of the Act, requiring consultation of stakehold-
ers, and has also made its way in to the scientific decision-making processes. While a
seemingly counter-intuitive move for pure-science fora, this latter is not unexpected:
the introduction of user pays for fisheries science also introduced its corollary “user
says”, and the realisation that (for deep water at least) scientific decision-making is
indirectly shaping policy has made stakeholders want to have a say.
These conditions do not instil confidence in the observer hoping to see processes
guaranteeing production of objective, accurate scientific information.
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6.2 Science Only in Scientific Fora
6.2.1 The gloves are off in meetings, but so are hats
Encouragingly, during interviews some respondents argued that there was no need for
“safeguarding” objectivity as the scientific-technical status of meetings was appreci-
ated and respected. Interviewees lauded the scientific meeting rounds (FAWGs in par-
ticular) for their strict scientific and technical operation, which was seen as a great im-
provement on the lawyer-riddled meetings of yore. Some interviewees clearly relished
the way scientific forum participants could have heated technical disputes (“ripping
one another to shreds”) while putting aside their various interest-group affiliations.
Comments from several different quarters reinforced this impression of a clear
distinction in interviewees’ minds between values-based and scientific representation,
and what is therefore appropriate comportment for a science-only forum. Respondents
noted the science-only mandate of Ministry scientists, which particularly precluded
policy-making. There were also comments that as ENGOs’ modus operandi is cur-
rently values-based argument (being unable to hire scientists to represent them with
technical argument), their participation would be most appropriate in policy rather
than scientific meetings. This suggests that research participants believe in the value
of scientific information and the importance of keeping it as free as possible from
values-based, subjective influences.
Personal relationships: virtuous cycles
Interviewees made several comments about interpersonal relationships influencing meet-
ing participants’ behaviour. They generally saw New Zealand’s small and somewhat
incestuous fisheries management climate, where many key individuals have worked for
several stakeholder groups, as an advantage rather than as the government-capturing
negative influence of the “revolving door” theory. Meeting participants apparently feel
that as other scientists have been in their shoes at some point in their careers, they can
empathise and will behave with integrity (“play it straight” and science-only) even if
they are currently in opposing “camps”.
However there was also interview evidence (though much less) of the opposite ef-
fect. Some NIWA and MFish participants were quite frank about NIWA supporting
MFish arguments because the individuals concerned were former colleagues, consis-
tently with industry interviewees’ suspicions of mutual complicity in NIWA price-
gouging and MFish hyper-conservatism. Even if the positive forces of interpersonal
relationships are stronger than the cynicism and second-guessing of the negative influ-
ence, one should be concerned if this is the only safeguard for objectivity in science
meetings.
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6.3 Meanwhile, Policy Enters Scientific Fora
Concern is raised because interviews showed clearly that those involved in deep-water
scientific meetings are aware that an unfortunate artefact of New Zealand’s fisheries
management structures allows (or forces) decisions made in deep-water science fora
to substantively affect policy. This provides an opportunity for those involved to indi-
rectly shape policy, and while it can be an expensive one requiring expert representa-
tion, it can be very effective.
6.3.1 Pragmatic approach
Seeing an opportunity to shape policy, scientists in deep-water fora react pragmatically,
in accordance with four genres of drivers. These include: notions of “what is best” for
fisheries management according to their employer institutions’ norms and aims for
the world; personal norms of “what is right” for fisheries management; behavioural
norms set by the institution of the scientific community; and personal views of what
constitutes proper behaviour (and how to respond to perceived “cooperative” or “de-
fective” behaviour in others). There was wide variation in interviewees’ responses
(both inter-respondent and intra-respondent), indicating that the perceptible influence
of these drivers (as acknowledged, a subjective analysis by the researcher) seems to
ebb and flow significantly.
The high uncertainty in many pieces of deep-water research leaves room for sig-
nificantly different interpretations within the bounds of respectable, legitimate scien-
tific practice, making it extremely difficult to discern the boundary between scientific
and non-scientific drivers for any individual’s opinion regarding a study’s conclusions.
Nevertheless, interviews gave evidence of all four genres of individual and institutional
drivers interacting to determine meeting participants’ behaviour.
Opportunistic positioning in science fora
Non-government scientific forum participants seemed to be taking a pragmatic view of
scientific meetings. They saw the fisheries management system’s failures forcing the
deep-water science fora into a confused quasi-policy zone, thereby providing an op-
portunity to influence policy, so they want to ensure that any policy-shaping heads in
a good direction. At times, interviewees argued that the behavioural norms of the sci-
entific community are holding strong, vociferously denying any persistent, politically
relevant discrepancy in industry-affiliated scientists’ contributions to scientific fora.
Respondents pointed out that scientists whose professional reputations are tarnished
by being seen to be prone to such bias are of little use to the industry (or anyone), as
everyone second-guesses their views in light of this reputation. Industry scientists reg-
80 CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION
ularly tell the industry what it does not want to hear, which contributes to reassuring
them that the former are reputable professionals whose independence is intact.
Hired guns? Other research participants’ views of industry-engaged scientists also
varied, but these were largely disapproving variations. These ranged from relatively
cautious statements about “expertise, not advocacy” being a valuable industry con-
tribution to meetings, through to describing “conspicuous silences” where pieces of
research are erring in the industry’s favour while vociferous scientific critique is lev-
elled at studies erring against it.
At other points during interviews, industry-affiliated interviewees expressed the
influence of their employer institutions’ drivers. They were frank about the nature
of contracts: a scientist who too often tells the client what they do not want to hear
will not get their contract renewed. If there was any persistent discrepancy in industry
scientists’ contributions to science fora, which is having the desired effect in shifting
the analytical direction in their favour, this means they are doing their job well.
6.3.2 Effect of the pragmatic approach
Legitimate activity in a polarised context
It appeared that this is sometimes the case: interviews indicated that industry scientists
have been effective in shifting the mean of the scientific forum on at least one occasion.
The key example was a debate over the relative decline speeds of CPUE and stock
biomass, where two calculations off the same data produced widely varying estimates
of the population size. Scientifically-legitimate representation by industry scientists
positing and effectively arguing a different interpretation of the salient data (suggesting
the stock in question was at 40% of B0 rather than the Ministry’s 10% of B0), was
argued to have adjusted the FAWG’s research interpretation practice.
Shifting the mean of the forum’s decision-making Two parallel interpretations of
such data are now run, and the mean is used as the consensus result.2 To a point, this
is an example of beneficial scientific pluralism: a variety of scientific and technical
viewpoints debating the merits and shortcomings of studies, and quality-checking the
analysis by identifying points of weakness (i.e. where it is vulnerable to subjective
influences).
However, the key point is that industry scientists’ activity was effective in shifting
the FAWG’s interpretative approach towards the less conservative, “bigger population”
end of the spectrum. Even if it was a one-off and has not been accepted as a working
2Unfortunately the interview that yielded this information occurred near the end of the interview
period, which meant there was no opportunity to cross-reference with current MFish interviewees.
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hypothesis by the deep-water FAWG (as claimed), successive achievements of this kid
by industry scientists will undoubtedly have an effect on the scientific advice the forum
produces.
Shifting the mean: in one direction The nature of industry engagement — some-
thing industry-affiliated scientists were quite upfront about in interviews — means the
scientists would be doing their clients a disservice to lobby as hard for an interpretative
approach that moved the forum’s consensus towards the more conservative, “smaller
population” end. This is a role for scientists engaged by ENGOs, who would do ex-
actly as their industry-engaged colleagues but in the “opposite” direction. However
there are no such scientists present in deep-water scientific meetings, primarily be-
cause of the high cost of hiring stock assessment specialists of the calibre of those
engaged by industry. Industry-affiliated interview respondents rightly observed that it
is not the industry’s responsibility to make sure that the counter-argument to theirs is
presented. Ministry interviewees felt that it is the government’s role to ensure science
fora are risk-neutral overall, observing the thick skin Ministry scientists need to play
this role.
6.3.3 MFish role: neutral and aloof?
Several respondents described the MFish scientists’ role as “sitting above” the disputes
that might occur in science fora, and almost passively receiving and transmitting to the
Minister the scientific consensus at which the meeting participants arrived. Interest-
ingly, one unaffiliated and one MFish participant stated that an important MFish role is
ensuring meetings are risk-neutral. This suggests recognition of the fact that the neu-
tral arbitrator role requires the MFish chair to receive the meeting’s consensus view
(or at least the mean position of the meeting’s population) and transmit it as the truth.
Effect of unequal firepower
However at present the highly-trained, specialised experts in meetings represent the
Ministry and the fishing industry. If MFish seeks risk-neutrality, the opposite end of
the interpretive spectrum should be presented via legitimate technical argument by
scientists of equivalent “firepower” to those currently advising and representing for
the fishing industry. This is not happening because the best candidate for engaging
scientists and getting this done — ENGOs — cannot afford to do so. New Zealand
green groups are affected by the suite of well-documented barriers to political partic-
ipation that affects ENGOs worldwide. One SeaFIC interviewee canvassed the issues
succinctly. While acknowledging the broad “constituency” that green groups repre-
sent, s/he suggested that public apathy towards most marine environmental causes is
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reflected in ENGOs’ cash-strapped nature. The contrast in ENGOs’ and the fishing
industry’s resource mobilisation ability is due largely to the nature of the goods for
which they advocate. In deep-water scientific fora, the classic representation issues in
environmental management are thrown into sharp relief: the representatives of a small,
distinct, self-identifying constituency with a pecuniary interest in the resource (pursu-
ing fish as private goods) are pitted against the representatives of an almost indefinitely
large, indistinct constituency that cannot (or fails to) self-identify and fund represen-
tation of its (public good) interests in the resource. This phenomenon’s consequences
for funding and participation in science fora is why, despite being an allocation issue,
it is affecting the scientific and technical deep-water fora.
The SeaFIC interviewee’s statement finished with the comment that while funding
to assist ENGOs with expert representation is an option, for addressing the balance of
scientific “firepower”, such funding would have to be independent of government. This
links us to the role of the fora and those chairing it — government fisheries scientists.
6.3.4 Neutral, or risk-neutralising?
It is possible that Ministry scientists, who are fisheries experts, could themselves pro-
vide the scientifically-informed counter-arguments to scientifically-informed industry
arguments. In the absence of scientific representation of ENGOs, it is difficult to see
howMFish scientists might go about ensuring risk-neutrality in a forum without them-
selves wading into the debate and providing the counter-balance to a well-articulated
industry argument. This could be argued to be to the substantive benefit of a scien-
tific forum’s discussion, for it would mean the full spectrum of scientific positions on
a question is being presented and the salient hypothesis is being challenged from all
angles. However if MFish are supposed to take a neutral arbitrator role in meetings,
passively receiving the scientific consensus position at which the meeting arrives on
each research question, this raises some issues.
Interviews provided evidence both ways. Industry-affiliated and science provider
interviewees’ statements that where uncertainty is high MFish consistently take a con-
servative position could be interpreted as MFish being a scientific “devil’s advocate”
against industry arguments. A Ministry respondent stated that the government, cog-
nisant of the implications of the Fisheries Act’s environmental principles and aware of
the lack of expert representation for ENGOs, had expanded MFish’s Science Group
to improve scientific pluralism. One MFish respondent’s comment that NIWA rep-
resentatives help MFish in their efforts to risk-neutralise meetings by “flattening the
plane” suggests that it may be NIWA scientists who are trying to ensure the scientific
counter-argument to the industry case is presented.
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6.3.5 Scientific or democratic representation?
However, this taps into a significant issue: the distinction between representing the
spectrum of interest groups and representing the spectrum of scientific opinions. Tra-
ditional scientific principles would argue that the latter should have nothing to do with
the former, which is the premise behind the dual branches of New Zealand’s fisheries
management advice process. However, New Zealand’s legal, economic and social
landscape has inevitable implications for resource mobilisation and thereby for partic-
ipation with good scientific firepower.
There was significant disagreement over the degree to which conservatism by the
statutory managers of New Zealand’s marine resources could or should be legitimately
manifested in the scientific decision-making that goes on in these fora.
Government: special licence to position in science fora?
Analysis of interviews revealed a government variation on the pragmatic argument:
while the fisheries management system’s dual-branch structure continues to fail deep-
water fisheries and push policy-shaping influence into their science fora, MFish scien-
tists should actively ensure that any policy-shaping that occurs there is consistent with
or at least does not undermine government policy direction.
This means being cognisant of the flow-on effect a scientific decision may have
(which given deep-water species’ slow growth and the uncertainty common in deep-
water decision-making, could potentially include distributing a species through time)
and ensuring it is consistent with what they see government policy to be. This is
clearly another example of an employer institution’s non-scientific drivers directing
scientists’ behaviour, potentially in contravention of the ostensibly science-only status
of the fisheries science fora.
Evidence of wielding the special licence?
However the government is not just another stakeholder, and as an institution has a
clear obligation sourced in the social contract to pursue the wider public’s best in-
terests. When put in the unfortunate position where it seems necessary to act as a
government scientist instead of a pure scientist, should a member of MFish’s Science
Group be guided by some expression of the vox populi such as an Oceans Policy sur-
vey, or an interest group’s wishes? Or should he or she act on a more “philosopher
king” awareness of people’s perennial failure to express the kind of value in public
good natural resources (particularly complex, un-charismatic ones such as deep-water
bycatch species) that would result in a more socially-optimal investment in natural
capital?
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Conservative research purchasing decisions, for The Nation One situation where
the public does rise up and express its value for a natural asset is rare charismatic
megafauna, recently sealions and Maui dolphins. When discussing the issue of re-
search purchasing and the philosopher king / vox populi dilemma of government, re-
spondents’ comments about research into dolphins and sealions showed the legitimis-
ing power of a loud expression of the vox populi. There was relatively wide agreement
across industry, science provider and government interviewees that there was a “public
interest” in such biota, even to the point where industry respondents were resigned to
being cost-recovered for research into these species which would inevitably lead to
further cost (curtailment of fishing activity). Interestingly, there was wider than ex-
pected agreement that as government agents responsible for ensuring a continued flow
of unimpeachable, accurate science into the QMS, MFish scientists are obliged to be
conservative regarding the providers of taxpayer-funded fisheries research. This legit-
imises some (though, for industry participants, not all) MFish conservatism: wariness
of contracting industry to undertake research, and the view that the burden of proof
rests with the fishing industry to prove that their commissioned research is as objective
as the heavily peer-reviewed, fully-disclosed government-purchased research. How-
ever the extent to which risk to un-charismatic deep-sea biota in situ should be traded
off against risk to fishing was the source of much conflict, reflecting how deeply values
are embedded in this “wicked problem”. Some views were expressed very strongly,
and it is difficult to see how these opinions could be easily put aside and a solely sci-
entific and technical position taken when assessing the funding merits of or analysing
research aimed at such values.
Conservative research interpretation, for The Nation For research interpretation,
interviews provided some evidence that MFish scientists are consistently conservative
in their analysis. Industry interviewees described MFish scientists emphasising pes-
simistic interpretations of stock data; taking the most conservative position on each of a
sea-lion population model’s multiple variables (leading to the bycatch mortality thresh-
old being dismissed in court); and having to be dragged into accepting methodological
improvements (the aforementioned CPUE / biomass example). They complained of
the arbitrariness of MFish scientists, lacking the mandate to make policy decisions,
engaging in non-scientific positioning in meetings (effectively taking a “philosopher
king” role) in contravention of the scientific behavioural norm. Some MFish inter-
viewees’ description of marine resources in language such as “the family silver” and
”national assets” suggests they see a trustee element to their role, guarding both target
and non-target natural assets for future beneficiaries against the short-term greed of
present generations, though these were general statements.
6.3. MEANWHILE, POLICY ENTERS SCIENTIFIC FORA 85
6.3.6 Defensive counter-positioning in science fora
Even if its overall impact on scientific advice is hard to predict, this type of position-
ing seems likely to have a major impact on the perceived objectivity of science fora
by generally destroying their atmosphere of scientific austerity. It was described by all
genres of interviewees, both in accusations levelled against other meeting participants
and in describing their own behaviour. Defensive counter-positioning is a manifesta-
tion of several drivers: scientific, political and very personal. It stands in interesting
contrast to interviewees” statements that personal relationships between scientific fo-
rum participants mean they “play it straight” for the sake of their colleagues and old
acquaintances (see below). It is also an example of a cascade or spiral of reciprocal
defection, which suggests that any heroic efforts by participants to maintain coopera-
tive adherence to the science-only behaviour norm will be swimming against the flow.
Strong engagement by participants with authority (potentially a Chair) could possibly
turn this tide, particularly if they can draw on a personal connection with the defec-
tors, or otherwise rally a critical mass of “cooperators”. However acknowledgement
that one’s actions in a science forum are being driven by illegitimate (non-scientific)
motivations is highly unlikely, so any remedial action would have to be subtle and
would be vulnerable to being mis-interpreted (or missed altogether).
A vicious spiral
Defensive counter-positioning was described by industry interviewees who perceived
MFish and NIWA scientists as taking overly conservative positions in meetings. They
saw this as illegitimate policy-shaping by government scientists who lack the mandate
to do so, and as bad scientific practice (they saw a persistent, politically-relevant dis-
crepancy). The effect on other participants seemed to be causing a choice to defect
rather than cooperate (“well, if you’re not playing it straight and keeping it science-
only I don’t feel so bad about not playing straight either”). Meanwhile, industry-
affiliated interviewees saw the scientific effect of MFish and NIWA positioning as
shifting a meeting’s mean towards a more conservative interpretation of research, an
effect that industry respondents argued needed to be balanced off to bring the meet-
ing back to a value-neutral position. This is exactly the same view as that presented
by some Ministry interviewees, except that their positioning was redressing the ef-
fect of industry arguments shifting the meeting’s mean to an overly risky position.
Both groups therefore justified their counter-positioning as entirely reactive, in pur-
suit of scientific risk-neutrality in meetings. Interestingly, none of these interviewees
mentioned ENGO representatives as contributing to mean-shifting in meetings’ deci-
sions, which supports the contention that ENGOs’ typically generalist representation
in meetings is not seen as influencing outcomes.
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6.4 Research Funding’s Effects on Science
Fisheries science: starved of funding
A strong impression was gained that New Zealand fisheries research is underfunded.
While good arguments can always be made for more science, several interviewees
commented on the paucity of government funding for fisheries research in general, es-
pecially when compared to other OECD nations, and particularly given the QMS’
heavy dependence on scientific information. The funding situation seems particu-
larly poor for public good research to inform management of non-target marine biota.
Again, in the deep water area this is particularly grave, as the research is inevitably
expensive. However the 1980s’ and 1990s’ public service reforms, which heavily
reduced government science funding in favour of user pays, are undoubtedly a con-
tributing factor. Respondents noted that such limited funding essentially ignores the
public good in having sustainable fisheries, and forces worthy public good projects
to try to obtain industry research funding. Interviews revealed that this causes a sig-
nificant level of seemingly avoidable frustration and bad feeling across the interview
sample, which contributes to broader, more substantive conflicts over the macro-scale
goals of fisheries management.
6.4.1 Cost recovery
The final section discusses the effect of cost recovery on the scientific objectivity of
deep-water scientific fora. The influence of funding in science, and the degree to
which government-sourced funding (given governments’ transparency requirements
and “public good” mandate) can avoid this, inspire ongoing debate. From interviews,
one immediately obvious effect of cost-recovery on New Zealand’s fisheries science is
the engendering of great frustration amongst all those involved.
Double-edged benefits
There were some exceptions, notably that cost recovery makes the industry aware
of the behind-the-scenes costs of fisheries management and makes government more
careful about its expenditure. Interestingly, one product of this was industry argu-
ments for using industry vessels for research instead of the Tangaroa, and both in-
dustry and non-industry interviewees side cited anecdotal evidence for other parties’
unwillingness to genuinely commit to collaborative government-industry provision of
high-quality stock assessments. Industry respondents highlighted cost-recovery for ex-
pensive deep-water research as another reason for checking the Ministry’s and NIWA’s
sums (“if we have to pay for it, it’s got to be good quality”), citing anecdotes where
mistakes had been discovered in government-purchased research that would have lead
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to significant unnecessary loss for the industry. The extra industry scrutiny thus at-
tracted to research, particularly projects which seem likely to lead to financial loss,
is a feature of the New Zealand cost-recovery system with its “user pays” approach.
Rigourous testing and challenging of scientific studies is an important part of the sci-
entific process, but the way cost recovery directs this to projects according to their cost
implications means the benefits to New Zealand deep-water fisheries research are a
fraction of what they could be if equal scrutiny was applied across the board. The
second-guessing problem and disparity of scientific firepower between stakeholder
groups are also relevant. Cost recovery’s effect on science thus links to the issues
of participation and thereby to the question of distributing rents from fisheries.
Crippling science?
Interview questions about cost recovery’s effects on science elicited overwhelmingly
negative reactions. The transaction cost burden of project-by-project, stock-by-stock
accounting weighed heavily on MFish respondents. Several participants discussed
the aforementioned perverse incentive (making industry judge projects on their cost
impacts, not their merits, and therefore sometimes oppose good research initiatives).
Public good research into the marine environment in general was widely seen as an
important government responsibility, but there was conflict over the rules apportion-
ing funding responsibility for research into the environmental externalities of fishing
(which is partially cost-recovered and can result in TAC and bycatch limit reductions).
In part this reflects different views over the costs of extracting fish (capture of natural
resource rent), and whether the fishes’ transformation into different forms of capital
and (eventual) return to the nation balances out the present-day cost of the research
necessary for TACs to be set and this fishing to occur. This is also an illustration of
the pervasive downstream effects of establishing a property right to a shared, multiple-
use resource, particularly without putting equivalent effort into establishing the policy
and regulatory framework to allow it to operate without externalities and other market
failures. If a natural resource management system is expected to operate at a constant
extreme information deficiency, it needs decision rules appropriate to a context of high
uncertainty.
6.5 Summary
Analysis of interview material in light of the conceptual framework paints a less-than-
promising picture of the safeguards for objectivity in New Zealand’s deep-water fish-
eries science processes.
However, the key point is that the shifts towards a new, modern approach to gov-
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ernment decision-making (discursive, participatory, drawing on a wide range of infor-
mation) have been made for the fisheries science processes in a spirit of optimistic
naı¨vete´. This has great faith that while the “black box” of fisheries science decision-
making will be cracked open to get the legitimising benefits of participatory democracy
through stakeholder involvement, the canons of traditional scientific objectivity will
nonetheless be respected by all participants because, after all, this is a pure-science
process. All the decision rules and protocols needed are those of orthodox science,
since people participating in these scientific decision-making meetings are all scien-
tists in whom respect for these canons has been deeply engrained by their training.
This seems to put considerable pressure on the processes we rely on to produce
accurate information on New Zealand’s deep-water biota. This role is critically im-
portant for the information-hungry QMS, and (as observed) especially so for poorly-
understood, depleted, slow-growing deep-water stocks. Where there is more sufficient
scientific information this is less problematic, but in the deep-water arena uncertainty
and the stakes are so high that neither process can provide adequate information in iso-
lation. Deep-water fisheries management decisions fall into the gap between the two
processes, and there is no combined science / policy structure to deal formally with its
decision-making needs.
The acknowledged importance of hard-science information for linking the QMS
model to reality adds to the strong “authority of science” basis of government fish-
eries management. The result is that the scientific arm of the fisheries management
process picks up the day-to-day decision-making needs, and thereby steps into the
no-man’s land between the policy and science processes where policy elements in-
filtrate scientific decision-making. (It should be noted that this investigation would
be complemented and rounded out by investigation of the policy arm of deep-water
decision-making, but scope and time forbade this.)
The quasi-policy activity occurring in deep-water fisheries scientific fora, ultra
vires its scientific-technical mandate, is a pragmatic reaction to the need for deep-
water fisheries management to keep operating, and is an artefact of the New Zealand
fisheries management system’s structural unsuitability for risk society contexts. It is
an unfortunate situation, for which no single person can be blamed. The question is
whether under these difficult conditions the scientific process is continuing to do its
fundamental job: produce clean accurate pictures of the submarine situation. It is
particularly essential that this keep happening in the deep-water context because the
most serious consequences of getting management decisions wrong — potential local
extinctions of slow-growing species, for example — fall on the biota, and the science
process is the only source of information we have on this ecological component of
fishery.
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In the absence of policy direction that could provide some guidance for this subop-
timal situation, the uncertainty more or less ubiquitous in deep-water fisheries research
opens the door for the effects of policy-oriented positioning by science forum partici-
pants to have a potentially significant impact.
If all those involved were “playing it dead straight” and refusing to entertain any
thoughts of influencing policy, scientific decisions would still be having an impact
on policy but in a much more haphazard and arguably weaker way than they seem
to be. Positioning seems to be occurring on several fronts, driven by a wide variety
of interrelated motivations and — somewhat surprisingly — coexisting with scientific
drivers which might be expected to curtail the effects of the non-scientific imperatives.
While this is the result of different groups of people doing what they think is best,
the net effect appears to be to place the objectivity of deep-water science decision
making in jeopardy. There does seem to be having a noticeable effect on scientific
outputs. Interviews revealed that the mean of the scientific opinion distribution in
meetings, taken as the “truth” for practical purposes in accordance with traditional
science principles, has been shifted on at least one occasion. This is likely to effect a
permanent shift in the FAWG’s interpretation of such research. Were such shifts as this
happening in both the “riskier” and the ”more conservative” directions, a layperson
may feel reassured that overall these phenomena were unlikely to have a significant
effect on deep-water fisheries management.
However the distribution of scientific firepower in meetings indicates that this will
not happen. ENGOs, the most natural candidate for an equivalent opposite to the
fishing industry, cannot afford to hire scientists of the calibre necessary to affect the
scientific mean in research fora. Ministry scientists cannot take this role without be-
ing seen to be engaging in positioning, which is precluded by their ostensible role as
neutral arbitrators of meetings who receive and transmit each forum’s decisions to the
Minister as scientific advice. While there is an argument that such positioning would
fulfil the wider public interest protection role of government, it is dangerous to have
specialised scientists making quasi-policy decisions without either the training or the
mandate.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
New Zealand’s fisheries management structures are subtly failing deep-water fisheries.
Deep-water species’ and ecosystems’ unique characteristics and their proven vulnera-
bility to manufactured risk make them demanding management subjects, arguably the
most difficult of New Zealand’s fisheries. However our ignorance of them, added to
their slow-growing nature, means there is potentially much to lose by getting it wrong.
The separate science and policy components to New Zealand’s fisheries management,
a phenomenon by no means unique to this country and recommended by traditional ap-
proaches to both disciplines, has here been taken to an extreme. New Zealand’s policy
and science components seem to be so strongly divided that they cannot come together
in a way that would allow the wicked problem deep-water fisheries management to be
tackled in a regularised, transparent way.
Starting at a disadvantage
The year-on-year demands of the QMS for scientific information, administrative effort
and catch level decision-making, with very limited science funding, mean it is diffi-
cult for the Ministry to catch its breath and undertake the self-reflexive exercise that
a concerted post-normal science approach to deep-water fisheries management would
require. The acknowledged importance of hard-science information for linking the
QMS model to the reality in the sea adds to the strong “authority of science” basis
of government fisheries management. The result is that the scientific arm of the fish-
eries management process picks up the day-to-day decision-making needs, and thereby
steps into the no-man’s land between the policy and science processes where policy el-
ements can easily infiltrate into scientific decision-making. (It should be noted that this
investigation would be complemented and rounded out by investigation of the policy
arm of deep-water decision-making, but scope and time forbade this.) At the same
time, scientific decisions that have to be made are being made — the system is func-
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tioning for deep-water fisheries — but the objectivity of the science being fed into this
system is highly vulnerable. This is because scientific decisions with significant policy
implications are being made in a forum that is not designed to handle them; in fact it
is designed for a policy-free decision-making context (and highly valued as such).
The quasi-policy activity of the deep-water science fora is a pragmatic reaction to
the need for deep-water fisheries management to keep operating, and is an artefact of
the New Zealand fisheries management system’s structural unsuitability for risk soci-
ety contexts. It is an unfortunate situation, for which no single person can be blamed.
The question is whether under these difficult conditions the scientific process is con-
tinuing to do its fundamental job: produce clean accurate pictures of the submarine
situation. It is particularly essential that this keep happening in the deep-water context
because the most serious consequences of getting management decisions wrong —
potential local extinctions of slow-growing species, for example — fall on the biota,
and the science process is the only source of information we have on this ecological
component of fishery. The different stakeholders in deep-water fisheries appreciate the
importance of high-quality, accurate science for fisheries management, and ascribe to
the principles of objectivity that scientific practice sets out to ensure this.
Scientific objectivity is at risk
However, while the forces of interpersonal relationships and individuals’ dedication to
“playing it straight” are undoubtedly helping to preserve some objectivity in science
fora, a much more significant force is the various positioning activities of meeting
participants revealed in interviews. Whether it be positioning in the cause of value-
neutrality to redress a perceived imbalance in a meeting’s scientific opinion distribu-
tion, positioning to ensure the greater good is pursued, or positioning to “do right by”
those whom one represents, deep-water scientific meetings are very far from clean,
technical fora.
This does seem to be having a noticeable effect on the scientific outputs. The
mean of the scientific opinion distribution in meetings, which for practical purposes is
taken as the “truth” (in accordance with traditional science principles), was shown to
have been shifted on at least one occasion. This is likely to effect a permanent shift
in how the forum handles CPUE research, a major proportion of stock assessment
information.
While the limitations of this study are significant, a layperson would be far from
satisfied that New Zealand’s deep-water science processes are providing and will con-
tinue to provide objective scientific information. As observed, objectivity is the best
measure the scientific process can offer for the accuracy of the information it provides
on any phenomenon. The natural sciences, in turn, are despite their shortcomings the
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best tool at society’s disposal for gaining an accurate picture of the world. Without
accurate scientific information about what is going on in our deep seas, New Zealand’s
fisheries management structures risk being an elaborate and well-constructed house
of cards, with the distinction that houses of cards do not potentially court significant
ecological risk or economic harm.
Further research
Contemporary New Zealand has to deal with a legacy of manufactured risk in its deep
sea fisheries. The wicked problem of deep-water fisheries and marine resource man-
agement needs management structures that acknowledge its wickedness. This means
approaching our policy and scientific advice structures with an awareness of their lim-
itations and those of the information they provide. A significant contribution would
be made by a stocktake of the different information sources on which New Zealand
deep-water fisheries managers can draw, an unflinching assessment of their different
strengths and weaknesses, and identification of the conditions under which they can
(or fail to) provide the most robust information possible. This would provide the ba-
sis for looking at establishing a special deep-water fisheries management forum that
combines scientific and non-scientific advice in a regularised, transparent way, ac-
knowledging openly where the scientific contribution ceases and where more subjec-
tive considerations must take over. Without this, we will continue trying to navigate a
wicked environmental problem with a highly specialised and unsuitable vessel, rather
than the post-normal science and policy vehicle which could enable genuine sustain-
able fisheries management.
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Appendix A
Glossary
ACE Annual Catch Entitlement
BMSY biomass producing Maximum Sustainable Yield
B0 “virgin”, unfished (natural state) biomass
BPA Benthic Protection Area
CCAMLR Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
CPUE Catch Per Unit Effort
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
ENGO Environmental Non-Government Organisation
FAWG Fisheries Assessment Working Group
ITQ Individual Transferable Quota
MALFiRM Maximum Allowable Fishing Related Mortality
MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield
NIWA National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research
QMS Quota Management System
RCC Research Coordinating Committee
RPG Research Planning Group
SeaFIC the New Zealand Seafood Industry Council
SMEEF Strategy for Managing the Environmental Effects of Fishing
TAC Total Allowable Catch
TACC Total Allowable Commercial Catch
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Appendix B
Participant Information
Participant Information Sheet for “Fishing in the Dark: Information Flows
and the NZ Orange Roughy Fishery”
Isabella Cawthorn
Institution: School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria Univer-
sity of Wellington
Supervisors: Cath Wallace
Senior Lecturer, School of Government
RichardWillis Senior Lecturer, School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences
Duration of research: March 2006–September 2007
I am a student researching for a thesis to complete a Masters in Environmental Studies.
My research has two objectives:
• Using economic, political and institutional theories and literature, I will develop
a framework through which I can examine how New Zealand’s approach to fish-
eries management and fisheries science has developed
• Using deep-water fisheries research forums’ documents and personal interviews,
I will analyse whether there are any trends visible in the fisheries research-
handling process.
I’m focussing on deep-water fisheries, specifically orange roughy, for purposes of
simplicity. To supplement the data I get from research coordinating forums, I would
like to interview individuals from the groups involved — the industry, the Ministry
of Fisheries, environmental groups and science providers — to learn their views and
gain an appreciation of the different perspectives. Participants will be invited to take
part in informal and semi-structured interviews on a non-attributed (no names given)
basis, which will be about 1 hour long. Interviews will be tape-recorded as a back-
up to notes I will take during the interview. This data will be confidential to me as
the researcher, but due to peer review and academic accountability requirements one
supervisor must also have access to the raw data. One of my supervisors, Cath Wal-
lace, is involved in the fisheries management arena as an environmental lobbyist who
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attends many relevant forums. Access to interview data will therefore be restricted to
my other supervisor, RichardWillis. My father, Martin Cawthorn, is a marine mammal
biologist who frequently works as a consultant for various fishing industry groups. He
will not have access to interview data except as used in research publications.
As a participant you are free not to answer any interview questions if you wish,
and / or after the interview has taken place, to withdraw your participation at any time
up until 31st December 2007. You can also request your identity to be obscured to
the desired degree in the thesis and any derived presentations — for example you may
choose to be identified only by sector (eg “a research provider”).
During the interviews I will ask permission to acknowledge your contributions by
putting your name and position in a dedicated “acknowledgements” section of the re-
port, which of course you are free to decline.
A summary of the research findings will be sent to all participants so you can com-
ment. The final thesis will be submitted to the School of Geography, Environment and
Earth Sciences for marking, and will be deposited in the University Library. All tape
recordings and transcriptions will be destroyed five years after publication. A copy of
the thesis will also be given to the Ministry of Fisheries as an independent study. If
given the opportunity, I may present my research at an academic or professional con-
ference, and busmit articles based on it to academic journals.
Please feel free to contact me or my supervisors with any questions.
Thankyou for your time
Isabella Cawthorn — cawthoisab@student.vuw.ac.nz, or phone (04) 463 5233 x8374
Cath Wallace: email cath.wallace@vuw.ac.nz (first words of subject line must be
“Cawthorn study”), phone (04) 463 5713
Appendix C
Interview scheme
Interviews with participants will draw on the following themes:
• The role of science in natural resource management, and basic principles of
science provision. Questions on this theme will address the position and role of
science in managing natural resources (particularly those that are publicly- or
state-owned), and issues of fisheries research purchasing.
• Risk and uncertainty in the Quota Management System (QMS). This theme will
include questions about different groups’ various perspectives on risk thresholds
and acceptable levels of scientific uncertainty in fisheries generally and differ-
ent fisheries, and about how risk is handled in the QMS and in New Zealand’s
fisheries management fora.
• Devolution of responsibility to the fishing industry and the relationship between
industry and regulator, and the implications for fisheries science and manage-
ment. This theme will look at the evolution of the relationship since the early
1980s and address any significant events or developments which may have sparked
changes in the relationship.
• Institutional structure of the government’s fisheries management and science
organisations, and the implications of various structures for their performance.
This theme will examine whether the restructuring of theMinistry of Agriculture
and Fisheries (and its Fisheries Research Division) into the Ministry of Fisheries
and NIWA has had any effect on the two bodies’ interactions and performance.
• Contestability of research provision and the viability of the fisheries science
provision market in New Zealand. Related to the previous theme, this one will
address the issues of the extent to which competitive provider markets are func-
tioning in New Zealand, the impact that the requirement for fisheries research
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contracts to be contestable has had on research provision, and the potential for
industry involvement as a research provider for deep-water species
• The effect of section 10 of the Fisheries Act 1996 (the requirement that all man-
agement decisions be based on the best available information) on fisheries sci-
ence and management - whether it has had any effect, and if so what effect and
why
• The effect that cost-recovery has on science in the QMS and on the relationship
between industry and regulator - if any effects exist, and why that might be the
case, and what those effects are.
• The past and potential role of resource rentals, and how they fit into the existing
climate of relationships between regulator and industry and into current guiding
principles for fisheries management. This theme will address the topic of any
influences that resource rentals had (when they were operating) on the relation-
ship between government and industry, and what implications this might have
for the relationship in the present and future. It will also look at how the issue
of resource rentals, as an indicator of approaches to the concept of ownership of
fisheries resources.
Appendix D
Human Ethics Forms
Consent form for participation in “Fishing in the Dark: Information Flows
and the NZ Orange Roughy Fishery”
Isabella Cawthorn
Institution: School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria Univer-
sity of Wellington
Supervisors: Cath Wallace
Senior Lecturer, School of Government
Richard Willis
Senior Lecturer, School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences
Date:
I agree to take part in an informal, semi-structured interviewwith Isabella Cawthorn,
the researcher, as part of her thesis for a Masters of Environmental Studies at Victoria
University.
I have been informed of the objectives of this research. and I understand that the in-
terview will cover topics relating to fisheries management and the provision of science
on deep-water species, particularly orange roughy. I understand that the interviews
and the resultant data will be confidential, and that I am free not to answer questions,
or to withdraw at any time without consequence. My name and job title will not be
used unless I wish to be acknowledged in the research. I can choose to nominate spe-
cific parts of my interview for different levels of non-attribution if I wish. Once the
interview has taken place, I may withdraw my material from inclusion in the study at
any time prior to 31st December 2007.
I am aware that the interview will be tape-recorded solely for the researcher’s use
for the purposes of this research, and that interview transcripts will only be seen by
her and her supervisor and will be treated confidentially. I know that I can request the
tape-recorder to be turned off at any point during the interview.
Before the thesis is submitted, I wish to be sent a summary of the findings of this
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research.
Name:
Date:
Signature:
Isabella Cawthorn: email cawthoisab@student.vuw.ac.nz
phone (04) 463 5233 x8374
Cath Wallace: email cath.wallace@vuw.ac.nz (first words of subject line must be
“Cawthorn study”), phone (04) 463 5713
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Waiver of Confidentiality
I, [insert name here], have been interviewed by Isabella Cawthorn as part of the “Fish-
ing in the Dark” research project. I have chosen that my identity will not remain
confidential.
Isabella Cawthorn, of Victoria University of Wellington and any presentations and
publications which use material from this project have my permission to publicly iden-
tify me by name by organisation (delete any which do not apply) by sector and to use
any transcript of this interview as an accurate representation of what I have said. I ac-
knowledge that the small nature of New Zealand’s fisheries management community
may make identification possible for those individuals familiar with the community,
regardless of the level to which my identity is obscured.
I do / do not (delete one) wish to nominate part(s) of my interview to be more
confidential than the rest. (If this option is chosen, please refer to “Additional Waiver
of Confidentiality” sheet.)
Name:
Date:
Signature:
104 APPENDIX D. HUMAN ETHICS FORMS
Additional Waiver of Confidentiality
I, [insert name here], have been interviewed by Isabella Cawthorn as part of the “Fish-
ing in the Dark” research project. I have chosen that my identity will not remain
confidential, as documented on the “Waiver of Confidentiality” sheet.
I wish to nominate part(s) of my interview for a different level of confidentiality
from the bulk of the interview.
For the section of my interview from dictophone timer reading [insert dictophone
reading here] to dictophone timer reading [insert dictophone reading here], Isabella
Cawthorn, of Victoria University of Wellington, and any presentations and publica-
tions which use material from this section have my permission to publicly identify me
by name by organisation (delete any which do not apply) by sector and to use the tran-
script of this section as an accurate representation of what I have said.
Name:
Date:
Signature:
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To Whom It May Concern:
I hereby give consent for [insert name here] to be interviewed by Isabella Cawthorn as
part of her Masters of Environmental Studies research.
Name:
Position:
Organisation:
Signature:
Date:
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